Mounted Officer Cristel Patterson with one of her fans at "Kids and Cops"

The Clarksville Tactical Response Team, garbed in black uniforms, was clustered about the response truck. “Bob,” he CPD’s bomb-sniffing robot was availabble for public inspection — something that appealed greatly to young children enamored of robots and movies like the recent “Wall-E.” The Mounted Police were on hand, allowing youngsters to hop up for a quick picture taken with a mounted officer astride several of the department’s magnificent horses. The canine division brought its dogs to meet and greet the public. – A description of the 2008  “Kids & Cops” event

Images from the 2008 Kids & Cops event

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Flier

The City of Clarksville and Montgomery County intend to submit a joint application for the 2009 Byrne Justice Assistance Grant in the amount of $486,980, with the funds to be shared $219,141 to the County and $267,839 to the City to be used for traditional law enforcement and crime prevention activities. Any person wishing to make a comment regarding use of funds is invited to attend a public comment period April 30th, 2009 at 1:00 pm.  This session will be held downstairs in the patrol briefing room at The Clarksville Police Department, 135 Commerce St., Clarksville, Tennessee.

On December 3, 2008, a 76-year-old female was charged with Solicitation of Aggravated Arson.  The individual in custody is Dorothy Suggs (W/F, DOB 6/29/32, of Locust Street, Clarksville, and has a bond of $1,000.

On four separate occasions, Dorothy Suggs, approached an individual and offered them money to commit arson on a Duplex residence, which she owns, at 305 Locust Street, Clarksville.  Suggs advised the individual to place a candle next to a couch to start the fire.  The individual asked ‘what if the occupants of residence were there’; Ms Suggs made a statement that she didn’t care.  Dorothy Suggs was taken into custody and booked into the Montgomery County Jail.

The investigator is Detective Gary Hodges.

Lets take a look at other risks these cameras subject you to. Remember, under these “civil violations” the city’s standard of evidence is much lower that in a criminal case, and you are basically presumed guilty, unless you can prove yourself innocent.

In other words, the city had to prove that Brown owned the Chevy, and that the Chevy was photographed on September 18, 2006. It did not have to prove Brown did anything wrong — mere ownership of the vehicle constituted the civil crime. Moreover, the court found this arrangement did not violate the constitutional protections against self-incrimination because Brown did not need to admit guilt — he was automatically guilty. “Again, this misses the point,” Judge Swiney wrote. “City Code Section 17-210 does not make the driver of the vehicle liable. Rather, it is the owner of the vehicle who is responsible for a red light violation, regardless of who actually was driving.” – Tennessee Appeals Court Embraces Red Light Cameras

Recent incidents in Georgia and Louisiana call into question the common assertion of photo enforcement advocates that the camera never lies. Officials in charge of red light camera and speed camera programs claim it is “rare” for erroneous tickets to be issued because a human police officers diligently verifies each and every citation for accuracy before it is issued.

It appears that Lafayette, Louisiana, made no such check when, as KSLA television reported, it mailed a black man’s red light camera ticket to a white man. The city accused Alan Dukes, the owner of a 2005 Honda motorcycle, of speeding on June 4. Yet the photograph of the alleged violation clearly shows a black man riding a Harley Davidson motorcycle. Dukes maintains that he is innocent. “You can see there’s no close resemblance, whatsoever,” Alicia Dukes told KSLA in comparing a photo of her husband to the ticket photo. Lafayette’s director of photo ticketing, Tony Tramel, insisted it would cost too much money to have police officers witness violations and ticket drivers in person. “Do we make errors or mistakes? Occasionally it does happen,” Tramel admitted. “Can we be absolutely perfect? I wish we could.” Lafayette’s error is the inverse of a 2006 situation in Scottsdale, Arizona where a black man was sent a white man’s speeding ticket.

In Atlanta, Georgia it was the owner of a white car that was sent a ticket for an offense committed by a black car. WPLG television reported on this case where great grandmother and Hollywood, Florida resident Evelyn Singer received a ticket for running a red light in Atlanta at 6:30am on June 24 at the intersection of Courtland and Baker streets. The document insisted that Singer pay $70. Singer responded with a certified letter explaining that her white Acura looked nothing like the black Pontiac committing the offense alleged in the ticket photograph. Moreover, she has not been to Atlanta in thirty-five years. When Singer later called to confirm whether the ticket had been canceled or not, the courthouse either put her on hold or hung up while the Miami television station’s cameras were rolling. After several frustrating attempts, Singer reached a a human and asked how often the cameras make mistakes. “It doesn’t really matter as far as what we’re trying to accomplish,” the unidentified Georgia courthouse official responded. The court told WPLG that it was likely Singer’s ticket would be canceled.

Tell our City council and Mayor that we want them to stop! planning on bringing this dangerous revenue generating scheme to our town! Just say no! to traffic enforcement cameras on our streets!

Sources: The Newspaper: A Journal of the politics of driving: Innocent Florida, Louisiana Motorists Receive Bogus Photo Tickets, Tennessee Appeals Court Embraces Red Light Cameras & KSLA-TV (LA), 7/18/2008: Traffic cameras: Are they cause for controversy or celebration?

Mounted Officer Cristel Patterson with one of her fans at "Kids and Cops"

Kaye Jones, president of the Citizens Police said the program was designed “to introduce children to local law enforcement in a positive way. Too many times youngsters first encounter police in instances of domestic violence, of accidents or disasters, or some other negative instance. This is another view of our law enforcement officers and what they do.” It is the second year this program has been held.

Jones noted that the choice of date and location was made to coincide with the tax-free weekend, maximizing the opportunity to interact with the largest possible numbers of families and children.

The Clarksville Tactical Response Team, garbed in black uniforms, was clustered about the response truck. “Bob,” he CPD’s bomb-sniffing robot was availabble for public inspection — something that appealed greatly to young children enamored of robots and movies like the recent “Wall-E.” The Mounted Police were on hand, allowing youngsters to hop up for a quick picture taken with a mounted officer astride several of the department’s magnificent horses. The canine division brought its dogs to meet and greet the public.

There was a steady line of cars and vans waiting for a car-seat check, making sure that the various kinds of car seats for infants and children were properly secured.

Photographer Bill Larson captured these images of the Cops and Kids Day on August 2.

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The devices were successful between 2006 and 2007 in issuing 19,087 tickets worth $1,431,525. “We think there’s a value to taking the program to the next step,” Police Chief Daniel Oates told the Rocky Mountain News newspaper.

However, at three of the four ticketing locations, rear end collisions increased dramatically from 2005 to 2006. At Mississippi Avenue and Potomac, rear end collisions jumped 175 percent. At Alameda Avenue and Abilene Street, the increase was 100 percent.

Only one intersection saw a 60 percent drop in one specific type of accident, likely as a result of the statistical phenomenon known as regression to the mean. This happens when a camera is installed at a location with an unusually high number of accidents in one year. As the number of accidents returns to the “normal” level, city officials will then credit the change to their camera program.

Source: Aurora may add cameras to catch red light runners (Rocky Mountain News (CO), 3/26/2008)

Here’s some information for you compiled from various websites:

• The average commute time for Clarksville workers is 24 minutes, compared with 26 minutes nationwide. A total of 26 fatal motor vehicle accidents occurred in Clarksville between 2001 and 2003, according to reports gathered by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. This is a rate of 2.5 fatal crashes per 10,000 population, which was lower than the national norm.
• In Tennessee about half of all property damage accidents result in injuries or fatalities. Since 1966 the rate of fatalities by population has fallen around 40%, by numbers of drivers over 50%, and by numbers of miles driven by almost 70%. We are driving allot more miles and yet our accidents are declining, a trend you will reverse in Clarksville if you put in red-light cameras.
• Among all tennessee motor vehicle accident deaths, about 65% were due to roadway departures, 16% were intersection related, 10% fatalities in crashes involving large trucks, and 104 nonmotorist (pedestrians and bicyclists) fatalities.

Tell our City council and Mayor that we want them to stop planning on bringing this dangerous revenue generating scheme to our town! Just say no! to traffic enforcement cameras on on our streets!

* Story courtesy of The Newspaper: A Journal of the politics of driving

The fact is that Red-Light and Speed cameras result in the roads where they are present becoming less safe. You are more likely to be injured or killed at a intersection after these cameras are put into place than you ever were before. Read this news report, and the study which follows it, then be sure to contact your city council member and tell them in no uncertain terms that you strongly oppose their dangerous revenue generating scheme.

Here’s a recent real life example from the Kingsport Times News reprinted with their permission. Some reports say this happened at a red-light camera intersection.

Video report – Wreck at Stone-Clinchfield intersection

Kingsport city firefighters worked to extricate an injured person from a blue Honda that tried to stop for a traffic light Tuesday at the intersection of Stone Drive and Bloomingdale/Clinchfield Street.The Honda stopped short, and a tractor-trailer behind it was unable to stop in time before hitting the vehicle.Two people were transported to the hospital. Officer Dale Farmer said their injuries were minor, and each were released Tuesday afternoon.

Photo by Erica Yoon.

There’s a video on their site as well, and I recommend everyone watch it. If Clarksville succeeds in putting into place red-light cameras this may well end up being you, or someone you love.

This is a study done by Professor Barbara Langland-Orban for the Florida Public Health Review a a joint electronic publication of the University of South Florida College of Public Health (USF COPH) and the Florida Public Health Association (FPHA).

Red Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase (Florida Public Health Review, 3/7/2008)

Introduction

Running a red light can cause severe traffic crashes especially when one vehicle runs into the side of another (i.e., an angle crash). Red light cameras photograph violators who are sent traffic tickets by mail. Intuitively, cameras appear to be a good idea. However, comprehensive studies conclude cameras actually increase crashes and injuries, providing a safety argument not to install them.

The National Motorists Association (NMA) represents driver interests and opposes cameras. In addition to concluding cameras do not improve safety, the NMA is concerned that local governments will not use effective methods to reduce red light running when earning money from cameras. For example, lengthening yellow light timings at traffic signals is effective in reducing red light running (NMA, 2008).

Nearly 80% of red light running occurs in the first second after the light changes (Office of the Majority Leader [OML], 2001). In addition, highspeed red light camera technology can identify splitsecond technical violations that are not visible to the human eye. Police in one community concluded that nearly 90% of infractions at a trial camera were splitsecond violations visible only to the camera lens, which would not result in a ticket from an officer(theNewspaper.com, 2006).

The majority of the red light running safety issue can be resolved through inexpensive engineering remedies that address infractions in the first second after the light changes. Inexpensive interventions include lengthening yellow light timings and/or adding a brief all-red light interval, which permits traffic to clear the intersection prior to releasing cross traffic (Federal Highway Administration and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [FHWA/NHTSA], 2003).

Camera fines have raised large amounts of money for cities and counties. San Diego, California, collected nearly $30 million in 18 months, with one camera alone generating almost $7 million. Smaller cities have also raised millions of dollars annually from cameras. Some jurisdictions have been accused of setting shorter yellow light traffic signal timings at camera intersections in order to increase tickets, thereby collecting more money from fines. Insufficient yellow light timings can create a dilemma zone where the distance is too short to stop, yet proceeding into the intersection results in running a red light (OML, 2001). Lending support to this concern, hundreds of camera citations in San Diego were dismissed after a judge concluded improper timings were set by the camera vendor (Fields, 2001).

The primary advocate for cameras is the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS, 2007; Federal Highway Administration, 2008). As the IIHS openly admits, they are wholly funded by automobile insurers. However, their major study, concluding cameras improve safety (Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002), has been criticized for research design flaws and not actually measuring changes in crashes and injuries at camera intersections (Burkey & Obeng, 2004). While insurers may not set out to increase crashes and injuries, increases in crashes and injuries indirectly contribute to automobile insurance’s performance as a growth industry. Increases in crashes can raise the risk rating of drivers in a community, which can lead to disproportionately higher automobile insurance premiums, and, subsequently, rising profits for insurers.

At present, Florida statutes do not permit red light camera evidence to be used as the sole basis for ticketing drivers for violating the law (Crist, 2005). Legislation to permit camera citations has been proposed since the 1990s, but none has passed to date. This paper explains:

1. red light running trends in Florida;

2. effective solutions to reduce red light running;

3. findings from major camera evaluations;

4. examples of flawed evaluations;

5. the automobile insurance financial interest in cameras; and

6. the increased likelihood of even higher crash and injury rates if cameras are used in Florida due to the high percent of elderly drivers and passengers.

Is Red Light Running a Growing Problem in Florida?

Traffic fatalities due to red light running are not increasing and have averaged 110 per year since 1998, accounting for less than 4% of Florida’s 3,000 annual traffic fatalities. Injuries from red light running crashes have steadily decreased since 1998, as have property damage-only crashes from red light running (Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2006). More importantly, the injury rate from red light running crashes has plummeted by a third in less than a decade, as illustrated in the graph. The statistics and graph suggest red light running is declining in Florida in the absence of red light camera use.

What Solutions Are Effective in Reducing Red Light Running?

Whereas some red light running may be intentional, particularly in traffic congestion, it can also be unintentional and due to circumstantial factors. Contributing environmental factors include yellow light timings that are set too short at traffic signals, obstacles that block a driver’s view of the traffic signal, and wet roads. The first recommended intervention at problem intersections is to conduct an engineering analysis, which will identify why red light running occurs. Intersection improvements should then be made in response to the findings (FHWA/NHTSA, 2003; Hemenway, 2001). For example, studies show that new traffic signals can reduce traffic fatalities by 50 percent, as they can increase visibility of the signal (TRIP, 2005). The following engineering countermeasures are recommended to reduce red light running (FHWA/NHTSA, 2003):

• Improve signal head visibility by increasing size or adding signal heads where one signal head is used for multiple lanes and may be blocked from view.

• Address east-west roads where sun angles silhouette the traffic sign head and add back plates to enhance visibility.

• Set appropriate yellow light time intervals that allow vehicles to clear the intersection or safely stop that is consistent with the speed limit, road grade and intersection width.

• Add a brief all-red light clearance interval to allow traffic in the intersection to clear prior to releasing cross traffic.

• Add intersection warning signs or advanced yellow flashing lights or reduce the approach speed to the intersection.

• Coordinate traffic signals to optimize traffic flow, eliminating interruptions.

• Remove on-site parking near intersections to increase visibility of pedestrians and cross traffic.

• Repair malfunctioning lights and avoid unnecessarily long cycle timings.

If a problem persists after intersection re-engineering, the FHWA and NHTSA (2003) advise the next steps are an education campaign and traditional police enforcement.

What Is Known About Cameras and Safety?

Major evaluations were conducted in Greensboro, North Carolina; Virginia; and the Canadian province of Ontario. The studies used multiple years of before-and-after data at camera intersections and comparison (no camera) intersections resulting in consistent findings. Camera intersections were associated with a significant increase in crashes. Increased rear-end crashes were a particular problem and may occur as drivers attempt to stop abruptly in order to avoid a ticket. The studies also found cameras were associated with increased injury crashes or crashes with possible injuries.

The Greensboro evaluation was conducted by the Urban Transit Institute at the North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University using 57 months of data (Burkey & Obeng, 2004). The study concluded that in many ways “the evidence points toward the installation of RLCs [red light cameras] as a detriment to safety.” Cameras were associated with:

• A significant increase (40%) in accident rates;

• A significant increase (40-50%) in possible injury crashes;

• No decrease in severe crashes.

The Virginia Transportation Research Council (Garber, Miller, Abel, Eslambolchi & Korukonda, 2007) analyzed camera programs in five jurisdictions using seven years of data. The study concluded their findings “cannot be used to justify the widespread installation of cameras because they are not universally effective.” They used a comprehensive statistical method of analysis (i.e., Empirical Bayes) that found cameras were associated with:

• A significant increase (29%) in total crashes;

• A significant increase (20%) in angle crashes;

• A significant increase (42%) in rear-end crashes, which did not decrease over time;

• A significant increase in injury crashes (18%), with the impact on injury severity reported as “too close to call”;

• Increases in crash costs.

A study conducted for the Ministry of Transportation in Ontario by Synectics Transportation Consultants (2003) evaluated two interventions (cameras and stepped-up police enforcement) in six jurisdictions following a public information campaign. Camera intersections had a:

• 16% increase in crashes, compared to an 8% increase at comparison intersections;

• 2% increase in injury or fatal crashes, compared to 10% and 12% decreases respectively at stepped-up police enforcement and comparison intersections.

Why Do Some Studies Conclude Cameras Reduce Crashes and Injuries?

All research studies are susceptible to design flaws, especially observational (i.e. nonexperimental) studies. Some of the major studies concluding reductions in red light running have exhibited such design flaws. One of these was conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) and a second was funded by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Both are explained below.

In the IIHS study, researchers compared Oxnard, California, which installed cameras, with three towns that did not. The first criticism of this study’s design is that camera intersections were not separately analyzed. Instead, crash and injury counts at Oxnard’s 11 camera intersections were added with all 125 signalized intersections in Oxnard (Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002). Thus, the study actually compared differences in crash and injury growth rates between intersections with and without traffic signals, and not between signalized intersections with and without cameras. A further criticism of this study is that the conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis were incorrectly reported. When the results were correctly analyzed for statistical significance, no change in total crashes could be substantiated (Burkey & Obeng, 2004; Kyrychenko & Retting, 2004).

The FHWA study (Council, Persaud, Eccles, Lyon and Griffith, 2005) evaluated seven jurisdictions in multiple states. The analysis concluded cameras were associated with decreased angle crashes and injures. The university professor who co-directed this study and provided the methodological ideas has also conducted research for the IIHS (Persaud, 2007; Persaud, Retting & Lord, 2001; Persaud, Hauer, Retting, Vallurupalli & Mucsi, 1997). The research design and reporting concerns are as follows.

• The researchers listed 15 geographic areas with camera programs. However, only seven areas were selected for the analysis because the researchers concluded “significant effects are likely for all crash severities” in these jurisdictions. The decision to selectively (non-randomly) choose among the 15 areas increases the chance of incorrectly favoring one conclusion over another (camera effectiveness or ineffectiveness). Three areas excluded by the researchers were included in the major studies from Virginia and Greensboro, North Carolina, which did not find reductions in angle crashes.

• The researchers called this a “before-andafter” study, yet it appears they did not compare crashes and injuries at intersections before and after cameras were installed. They did not report using the before period data in estimating expected crashes for the after period. Instead, the study made estimates of expected crashes and injuries for the period after cameras were installed using non-camera intersections. Also, counts of crashes and injuries from the before period were not reported in the results.

• In estimating crashes for the period after cameras were installed, the analysis excluded important factors that are known to affect intersection crashes. Changes attributed to cameras could actually occur from these excluded factors, such as differences in yellow light timings and speed limits.

• Although the Methods section identified six types of crashes (for example, red light running crashes), findings were reported for only angle and rear end crashes. Changes in crashes and injuries for the other types, including red light running crashes, and changes in total crashes and injuries were not revealed. This also renders the economic analysis incomplete since it did not include changes in total crashes and injuries.

• Instead of reporting the full results of the statistical analyses, only an example with made-up numbers was provided.

• Crash and injury counts were not reported by intersection or jurisdiction. As such, it is unknown where the favorable experiences attributed to cameras actually occurred. Correct reporting of research findings requires providing sufficient detail to allow other researchers to validate conclusions. It is impossible to replicate this study or to reanalyze the findings.

The public health policy implications are stark. People who are not trained in research methods are unlikely to identify methodological flaws. As such, these studies have been used in decision making. For example, the FHWA conclusions were presented in a legislative analysis of a Florida red light camera bill, along with IIHS research that referenced their Oxnard study (Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis, 2007).

Of particular importance is the comparison of the research methods performed by the studies that find at best no benefit due to cameras, or at worst increased harm, since these studies did not have similar research design flaws. The studies finding no safety benefit to cameras more readily provided details of their methodology with their appropriate application. They provide sample data that were actually analyzed and reported, and not irrelevant and made-up. These studies correctly take into account statistical error rates and margins of error of their findings. Also, they tend not to pick and choose sample data that support their conclusions, while discarding data that may potentially dilute desired findings.

Another potential research design issue is crash data. Local governments have used changes in violations or profitability as proof of successful camera performance instead of using changes in crashes and injuries. This may occur because local governments do not have accurate counts of crashes before and after cameras are installed. For example, Florida law does not require law enforcement officers to write crash reports for most property damage-only crashes (Florida Statutes, 2007). This allows for large differences in the percent of crashes reported. If all crashes are not reported, it is not possible to correctly determine changes in crash rates associated with red light cameras. An Australian study completed by Andreassen (1995) concluded cameras offered “no demonstrated value as an effective countermeasure”, but also identified concerns about the reliability of lists of accidents at camera sites. The importance of having good data was emphasized.

Why Might Insurers Support Cameras If They Increase Crashes and Costs?

More crashes lead to higher insurance premiums, leading to higher profits, which in turn lead to increases in insurance stock prices. In the absence of crashes, automobile insurance would become superfluous. This is not to say that automobile insurers actively seek to increase crashes, but to point out that an important component of insurance revenue growth is actual and perceived levels of “risk.” Similarly, the tobacco industry has emphasized revenue growth by increasing cigarette sales while downplaying the impact on the public’s health.

With automobile insurance, declining crash rates imply lower risk. In theory, insurance premiums should decline with fewer crashes, thereby reducing insurance revenues. Higher crash rates suggest higher risk; justifying higher premiums and profits. Due to the pricing methods used, automobile insurers do not have a financial incentive to lower crash rates or perceptions of risk.

Also, automobile insurance companies can profit if camera tickets are moving violations that add points to a driver’s license. Moving violation tickets allow insurers to charge higher premiums while incurring no additional cost. For example, if Florida’s proposed camera legislation from 2005 or 2006 had passed, camera citations would be moving violations under the existing red light running statute. Cameras would have photographed the license plate of a vehicle violating a red light and then the vehicle owner would have received a $250 ticket plus 4-points on their driver’s license (Florida House of Representatives [FHR], 2005; FHR, 2006). Even when tickets from red light cameras are not moving violations, an increase in moving violation tickets is still expected from the increase in crashes.

From 2000 to 2004, Florida moved up five spots to become the 6th most expensive state in which to insure a vehicle. A significant increase in moving violation tickets occurred from 2000 to 2004; along with a large increase in automobile insurance premiums. Statewide, automobile insurance premiums increased from $8.7 billion in 2000 to nearly $14 billion in 2004. Automobile insurers paid 73¢ on every premium dollar in 2000, versus 61¢ in 2004. This means the large increase in tickets was associated with increased insurance revenues and profits, while Florida’s crash rate remained the same (Florida Statistical Abstract [FSA], 2001; FSA, 2006; National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2004).

Are Any Camera Issues Unique to Florida?

Cameras could create an even larger increase in crashes and injuries in Florida since the state has the highest percent of elderly population in the U.S. The elderly have slower average reaction times and may be less likely to stop abruptly as other drivers do so at camera intersections. Further, the elderly are at greater risk for an injury or fatality when a crash occurs due to anatomic and physiologic changes that occur with aging and from the common use of blood thinners that increase the rate of bleeding. In the lower range of injury severity, the death rate for elderly patients hospitalized from a motor vehicle crash is three times higher (4.6%) than adults under 65 years of age (1.5%) (Pracht, Langland-Orban, Orban & Flint, 2007).

In 2001, Florida led the nation with the most older drivers killed in traffic crashes (268 fatalities), a 70% increase in just 10 years. In addition, Florida had the most traffic fatalities where an older driver was involved in the crash (456 fatalities). Among older drivers, 50% of traffic fatalities occur at intersections, which is more than twice the rate for younger drivers. Improved intersection design is known to reduce errors among older drivers. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is a leader in designing state roads that accommodate elderly drivers. The state’s elder driver program has designed and re-constructed state highways and streets to improve safety for older drivers (TRIP, 2003). In 2006, the FDOT Secretary was asked to allow cameras on state roads. The Secretary responded that more research was needed due to the large increase in rear-end collisions and recommended engineering solutions (Stutler, 2006).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The theory behind red light cameras as potentially effective is that they rely on deterring red light running primarily through punishment of a specific driving behavior and secondarily by changing drivers’ experience. By definition, the punishable behavior and resulting potentially harmful action will already have taken place when a ticket is issued. In other words, the crash, injury, and mortality risks do not change immediately, if at all. In contrast, the engineering solutions described above produce immediate reductions in red light running and potential crashes. Thus, even if red light cameras could be effective in the long run, which is debatable, they are associated with an added cost, consisting of fines, crashes and injuries that could have been avoided by using engineering solutions, which are effective in both the short term and the long run.

Because the rigorous and robust studies conclude cameras are associated with increased crashes and costs, any economic analysis of cameras should include these newly generated costs to the public. Indirect costs to the public are usually not considered in the calculation of total revenues and profits generated from red light cameras.

Cities and counties should follow the state’s lead and likewise pursue engineering improvements to enhance intersection safety for all drivers and passengers. Proven engineering practices and counter-measures can reduce crashes and injuries due to red light running, as well as other causes of intersection crashes. A public health approach to improved intersection engineering is particularly needed since 26% of Florida’s traffic fatalities occur at intersections (with and without traffic signals), in contrast to 18% nationally (NHTSA, 2005). This means that more than 22% of traffic fatalities in Florida occur at intersections for reasons other than red light running, as red light constitutes less than 4% of total traffic fatalities.

Further, red light cameras are an inefficient means to raise revenue for local and state governments and can disadvantage the state’s economy. This occurs from the significant amount of funds, paid by local drivers, that ultimately accrues to private in-state and out-of-state special interests from camera use, rather than fully accruing to local and/or state governments. If cameras are used in Florida, a portion of ticket fines (in essence, royalties) can accrue to the camera vendors in perpetuity, which are located in other states and countries. Likewise, the increase in crashes and probable injuries would result in automobile insurance rate increases, which could affect all drivers in a community due to the pricing methods used by insurers. A portion of the insurance increase would be returned to certain business interests in the state; for example, in the form of higher insurance agency commissions and payments to automobile repair shops, hospitals, doctors, and rental car companies. However, a portion of the insurance increase would accrue to out-of-state interests, such as automobile parts manufacturers and, more importantly, to out-of-state insurance corporate accounts. Thus, red light cameras result in fines and insurance increases that would transfer disposable income from Florida drivers to private businesses in and out of the state, in addition to local and/or state governments. It is not surprising that out-of-state special interests, such as camera vendors and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, advocate for camera use.

Finally, cities, counties, and the state should be very cautious in using traffic safety information from the automobile insurance industry. Insurance financial goals are to increase their revenues and profits, which do not necessarily include reducing traffic crashes, injuries or fatalities. Also, public policy should avoid conflicts of interest that enhance revenues for government and private interests at the risk of public safety.

References

Andreassen, D. (1995, February). A long term study of red light cameras and accidents (Research Report ARR 261). Australian Road Research Board Ltd. Victoria, Australia.

Burkey, M., & Obeng, K. A. (2004, July) Detailed Investigation of Crash Risk Reduction Resulting from Red Light Cameras in Small Urban Areas, Urban Transit Institute. Transportation Institute. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University (prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation).

Council, F. M., Persaud, B., Eccles, K., Lyon, C., & Griffith, M. S. (2005, April). Safety evaluation of red light cameras. Federal Highway Administration. Publication No. FHWA-HRT-05-048.

Crist, C. (2005, July 12) Subject: Traffic, use of unmanned cameras. Advisory Legal Opinion – AGO 2005-41. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://myfloridalegal.com/__85256236006EB5E1.nsf/0/CE01BE293FCEEA208525703C00720344?Open&Highlight=0,ago,2005-41.

Federal Highway Administration. Stop red light running facts and statistics. Retrieved August 29, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/redl_facts.htm.

Federal Highway Administration and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2003, March 20) Guidance for using red light cameras. Washington, DC.

Fields, M. (2001, August 28). Statement before the California Legislature Senate Committee on Privacy: Automated enforcement laws. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from http://www.iihs.org/laws/testimony/pdf/testimony_mmf_082801.pdf.

Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. (2006) Florida traffic crash facts. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/reports/crash_facts.html.

Florida House of Representatives. (2005). HB 1439 Red light violations. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=17099&SessionId=38.

Florida House of Representatives. (2006). HB 259 Red light violations. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=31782&SessionId=42.

Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis. (2007, April 20) Economic Expansion & Infrastructure Council. Bill # CS/HB 1247, Uniform Traffic Control. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=36326&SessionId=54.

Florida Statistical Abstract. (2001). Bureau of Economic and Business Research. University of Florida. (Table 17.72) Gainesville, FL.

Florida Statistical Abstract. (2006). Bureau of Economic and Business Research. University of Florida. (Table 17.72). Gainesville, FL.

Florida Statutes. (2007). Chapter 316 State Uniform Traffic Control: 316.066 Written reports of crashes. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0316/SEC066.HTM&Title=->2007->Ch0316->Section%20066#0316.066.

Garber, N. C., Miller, J. S., Abel, R.E., Eslambolchi, S., & Korukonda, S. (2007, June). The impact of red light cameras (photo-red enforcement) on crashes in Virginia. Virginia Transportation Research Council Research Report. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.virginiadot.org/vtrc/main/online_reports/pdf/07-r2.pdf.

Hemenway, D. (2001). The public health approach to motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol, with applications to firearms policy. Journal of Public Health Policy, 22, 381-402.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. (2007, June). Q&As: Red light cameras. Retrieved November 17, 2007, from the World Wide Web: www.iihs.org/research/qanda/rlr.html.

Kyrychenko, S. Y., & Retting, R. A. (2004, November). Review of “A detailed investigation of crash risk reduction resulting from red light cameras in small urban areas” by M. Burkey and K. Obeng. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.

National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). (2004). State average expenditures and average premiums for personal automobile insurance; 2003/2004 Auto Insurance Database Report.

National Motorists Association. Ticket cameras: NMA objections to photo enforcement. Retrieved September 14, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.motorists.org/photoenforce/home/alternatives-to-red-light-cameras/.

NHTSA National Center for Statistics and Analysis, (2005). Traffic safety facts 2005, U.S. Department of Transportation.

Office of the Majority Leader. U.S. House of Representatives (2001, May). The red light running crisis: Is it intentional?

Persaud B. (2008) Civil Engineering faculty page. Ryerson University. Retrieved November 17, 2007 from the World Wide Web: http://www.ryerson.ca/civil/facstaff/Faculty/bhagwant.html.

Persaud, B. N., Hauer, E. J., Retting, R. A., Vallurupalli, R., & Mucsi, K. (1997). Crash reductions related to traffic signal removal in Philadelphia. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29, 803-810.

Persaud, B. N., Retting, R. A., & Lord, D. (2001) Safety effect of roundabout conversions in the United States: Empirical Bayes observational before-after study. Transportation Research Report, 175, 1-8.

Pracht, E. E., Langland-Orban, B., Orban, D., & Flint, L. (2007, June 25). Differentials in triage to trauma centers and survival rates between elderly and non-elderly following motor vehicle crashes in Florida. Presented at Academy Health Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL.

Retting, R. A., & Kyrychenko, S. Y. (2002) Reductions in injury crashes associated with red light camera enforcement in Oxnard, California. American Journal of Public Health, 92, 1822-1825.

Stutler, D. J. (2006, March). FDOT: Red-light cameras need more research. Orlando Sentinel, A23. Synectics Transportation Consultants. (2003, December).

Final technical report: Evaluation of red light camera pilot project. Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Transportation.

TheNewspaper.com. California: Cops reject red light camera sales pitch, (2006. November 11) (excerpt from Photo finish for drivers, San Gabriel Valley Tribune (CA)) Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://thenewspaper.com/news/14/1441.asp.

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About the Authors

Barbara Langland-Orban (.edu) is Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. Etienne E. Pracht (.edu) is Associate Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. John T. Large is Assistant Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. This paper was submitted to the FPHR on February 6, 2008, reviewed and revised, and accepted for publication on March 3, 2008.

About the Florida Public Health Review

The Florida Public Health Review offers an electronic on-line journal of practice and scholarship of interest and relevance to Florida’s public health practitioner and academic communities. Because the Review is presented as an electronic medium, communication can be rapid and immediate upon completion of editorial and refereed approval

The text in this article is copyright 2008 by the Florida Public Health Review.

Two people will be testifying before the committee on Lundberg’s behalf. Laura Dial, Executive Director of the Tennessee Chapter of MADD, and Lt. David Corman of the Traffic Section of the Metro Nashville-Davidson County Police Department will be on hand to discuss the legislation’s many benefits.

The bill experienced some resistance in subcommittee last week, when members expressed concern over the ability of sober drivers to take friends home who are drinking, and also regarding sporting events, such as University of Tennessee football games.

Lundberg responded that he was from East Tennessee and understood the concerns, but that safety had to come first. “The bottom line is that this state must reform our drunk driving laws. There must be consequences for irresponsible actions—actions that kill and that put other law abiding citizens in grave danger,” he added.

In 2006, there were 1,287 fatalities on Tennessee roads with 509 due to alcohol-related crashes, a 7.6 percent increase from the previous year. Motor vehicle crashes are the leading cause of death among persons between the ages of 3 and 33, with 50% of the victims being in alcohol-related crashes. In addition, fifty-two percent of drivers that were involved in alcohol-related fatalities had BAC levels at or above .16.

“Our national highway experts have rightfully pointed out the flaws in our DUI laws. We fall short of half of their recommendations. That is unacceptable. We will work hard to make sure our roads are safer than this,” concluded Rep. Lundberg.

Detective Michael Patterson is presently investigating three robberies that have occurred in the St. Bethlehem area. All three robbery attempts involved women who were alone at the time of the incidents. The suspect’s car (shown at left) was caught on security camera and released by police.

On Friday, December 7, 2007, in the parking lot of Kohl’s, 2840 Wilma Rudolph Blvd, a female that was at her vehicle was approached by a black male, wearing a thick nylon jacket, with fur around the neck area. This male attempted to enter her vehicle; however, she had her doors locked and drove off.
Approximately three hours later in the parking lot of Kroger’s, 2100 Lowe’s Drive, while a female was entering her vehicle, she was approached by five males that demanded money. All suspects left in a maroon four door Dodge Neon or Chevy Malibu.

On December 9, 2007, a female was entering her vehicle in the parking lot of Circuit City, by Governor Square Mall, when she was approached by a black male wearing a black jacket with fur around the neck. The suspect demanded money and left in a dark red four door Dodge Neon.

Based on the descriptions provided, the vehicle is possibly a four door maroon or dark red Dodge Neon or Chevy Malibu. A surveillance photo has been released and if anyone can identify this suspect, they are asked to contact Detective Michael Patterson, District 3 Criminal Investigations at 931-648-0656 ext 3006.

All shoppers are caution to be alert and aware as they continue holiday shopping, and to report any suspicious activity immediately.

If the specter of another US foray into regime change disturbs you, Google the word “Tanter.” If the prospect of another country’s being bombarded with US weapons outrages you, and if inserting the adjective “nuclear” into the narrative sends a chill up your spine, go to the “Guardian” website and search “Tanter.” Or if you hanker to find out what a Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator can do to humankind, click onto the Union of Concerned Scientists.

But if you want to take a stand against another US/Israeli war crime, don’t come to Ann Arbor. Not unless you’re prepared for the worst. Unless you’re prepared to be brutalized by the cops, thrown in jail, and subjected to improper and punitive medical treatment, you’d better keep your mouth shut. Or so the University of Michigan, the Ann Arbor Police, and the Zionist forces in the community would have it.

When I became a doctor I knew I would encounter a lot of human suffering, but I never envisioned a time when my efforts to alleviate it would get me brutalized by the police, then charged with a crime. I never envisioned a time when I would witness another health “professional” brazenly violate the most fundamental principle of medical ethics: first do no harm. But thirty years after graduation, at a political event on the campus of the University of Michigan, those things happened.

The event was a presentation by Raymond Tanter, founder of the Iran Policy Committee and former member of the National Security Council under Ronald Reagan. Michigan’s chapter of the Zionist organization, the American Movement for Israel (AMI), brought him to town on November 30, 2006 to whip up support for regime change in Iran. The “Islamo-fascist regime” must be overthrown, according to Tanter, before they acquire a nuclear weapon, and one option for stopping them would be nuking them first. Some of the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrators the US has supplied to Israel would be OK, with Israel doing the deed.

A small group of folks showed up to protest. The room was packed, U of M cops were on hand, and the atmosphere was tense. Tanter fired up the crowd, especially when he declared that Israel will exist forever, triggering the longest and most boisterous of several rounds of cheering and applause from his supporters. But interruptions of dissent were not to be allowed, and the cops were there to make sure of it. One of the protesters, an Iranian woman, became the first target of the political repression in store for the night. At the behest of one of the AIM organizers, a U of M cop proceeded to remove her.

The cop, maybe 6′6 or bigger, grabbed her arm, dragging her to the floor, where he applied pressure point control tactics (PPCT) as she screamed. PPCT is what’s called a pain compliance technique, using the infliction of pain to force someone to do what you order. It’s used against someone who poses a serious threat of physical harm; someone, say, who’s in the cop’s grip, clutching a knife and on the verge of stabbing a person. In this case, the cop inflicted pain to force compliance with his order to stand up, while he pinned her to the floor with his knee. She kept screaming.

“Don’t hurt her,” called out the woman who’d been sitting in the next seat over, also an Iranian woman, a U of M Professor of Iranian History, in fact, and another dissenting voice at the event. One of the other protesters came to the first victim’s aid and was hauled away, cuffed and arrested. A second protester came to the victim’s aid and followed as she was hauled away. The AMI organizers were calling the shots.

I heard a commotion in the hall and stepped out of the room. In the hall I saw the same huge cop on top of the second protester who’d come to the first victim’s aid. The cop had the man, a relatively small guy in his forties, pinned down, arms pulled behind his back, getting handcuffed. The cop used PPCT against this person also, not once but twice. The man writhed and cried out in pain.

The cop used his far-greater strength and body weight, along with the force of his knee on his victim’s back to press his chest against the floor. It would be impossible for a person to inflate his lungs pressed against the floor with his hands cuffed behind his back like that. Asphyxiation being a well-known cause of death of people in custody, when the man started calling out that he couldn’t breathe, I approached, identified myself as a doctor, and instructed the cop to turn him over immediately. The victim went limp. The cop turned him onto his back. I saw that the victim had a wound on his forehead and blood in his nostrils. He was unconscious.

Reiterating numerous times that I was a doctor, I tried to move to where I could assess the victim for breathing and a pulse. The cop shoved me, until finally, after my imploring him to allow me to render medical care to the victim, he allowed me to determine that the victim was alive. But he refused to remove the cuffs despite my requests. A person lying with hands cuffed beneath his body risks nerve damage to the extremities and, moreover, cannot be resuscitated. I continually re-assessed the man, who had now become my patient, and who remained unconscious.

Eventually an ambulance arrived, along with the fire department and a contingent of Ann Arbor police officers. While the paramedics went about their business, the first thing being to have the cop un-cuff the patient, I tried to fulfill my obligation to my patient. I tried to oversee what the paramedics were doing, which, contrary to protocol and the normal relationship between physician and paramedic, was all that I was allowed to do. I was forced to stay away. What I witnessed in the course of their treatment appalled me.

When the patient didn’t respond to a sternal rub, one of the paramedics popped an ammonia inhalant and thrust it beneath the patient’s nostrils. If you’re interested in what’s wrong with that, google Dr. Bryan Bledsoe, foremost authority on paramedicine, and read his article condemning this dangerous practice. That it’s “just bad medicine” is sufficient to make the paramedic’s actions unacceptable, but what happened next made my blood curdle. He popped a second inhalant and a third, then cupped his hands over the patient’s nostrils to heighten the noxious effect. “You don’t like that, do you?” he said.

At that point I issued a direct medical order for him to stop, but he ignored me. “What you’re doing is punitive,” I said, “and has no efficacy.” Then as the patient retched, rather than rolling him onto his side to avoid the chance of his choking on his own vomit, a firefighter held his feet down and yelled, “don’t spit.” In thirty years of doctoring, I have never witnessed such egregious maltreatment of a patient. Again I spoke up, “this is punitive.” I hoped to shame the paramedical into stopping his unethical behavior.

Suddenly an Ann Arbor cop ordered me to move away. As I headed for my purse and coat, the cop attacked me from behind, twisted my arms with extreme force behind my back, and shoved me against the wall. I begged him to release my left arm, explaining that I had a serious condition affecting my shoulder, and pleading with him because of the excruciating pain he was inflicting on me. I told him that I would do whatever he demanded. I told him that I had been in the process of complying with his order to move out of the way and that I was heading toward where my purse and coat were. He told me to relax and wrenched my arms harder. I was in agony. I told him that I would sit down, anything, that he was really hurting me and begged him to release my arm. Eventually he let my arms down.

But his brutality did not stop there. He then forced me to stand in the stairwell in a corner for a protracted period of time. I asked him if I could please go home, as I was in pain, and I was deeply traumatized. In yet another raw display of abuse of power, he forced me to stand there, causing me ongoing suffering and humiliation, before finally allowing me to leave.

The U of M proceeded with prosecution of the other three people, but I heard nothing further from them until I filed a complaint of police brutality. Now I’m facing criminal prosecution, too, along with the Professor of Iranian History, who, like me, was charged after she filed a complaint. We five are being prosecuted for “assaulting/resisting/obstructing” police officers, and in my case, for “assaulting/resisting/obstructing” paramedics as well.

So, if you want to take a stand against another war, don’t come to Ann Arbor. Don’t come unless you believe in the slogan the Wobblies chanted back at the time of the First World War, when the government was rounding up opponents of that atrocity and throwing them in jail. Don’t come to Ann Arbor unless you too believe: AN INJURY TO ONE IS AN INJURY TO ALL.

Take Action

If you wish to help support Dr Wilkerson you should visit the Defend Catherine Wilkerson website

About Catherine Wilkerson

The author of this piece is Catherine Wilkerson, a physician who practices primary care at a clinic in Ann Arbor that provides care to underserved members of the community.

About the A.N.S.W.E.R. coalition

The A.N.S.W.E.R. Coalition formed on September 14, 2001. It is a coalition of hundreds of organizations and prominent individuals and scores of organizing centers in cities and towns across the country. Its national steering committee represents major national organizations that have campaigned against U.S. intervention in Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East and Asia, and organizations that have campaigned for civil rights and for social and economic justice for working and poor people inside the United States.

We wish to thank them for granting us their permission to republish this article.

Contacts between Police and the Public
By Matthew R. Durose, Erica L. Smith, and Patrick A. Langan, Ph.D. BJS Statisticians
A Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs
April 2007

An estimated 19% of U. S. residents age 16 or older had a face-to-face contact with a police officer in 2005, a decrease from 21% of residents who had contact with police in 2002. Contact between police and the public was more common among males, whites, and younger residents. Overall, about 9 out of 10 persons who had contact with police in 2005 felt the police acted properly.

Of the 43.5 million persons who had face-to-face contact with police in 2005, 29% had more than one contact. The most common reason for contact with police in both 2002 and 2005 involved a driver in a traffic stop. Other frequent reasons for contact included reporting a crime to police or being involved in a traffic accident.

Nearly 18 million persons — or 41% of all contacts in 2005 indicated that their most recent contact with police was as a driver in a traffic stop. This represented about 8.8% of drivers in the United States, a percentage unchanged from 2002. Stopped drivers reported speeding as the most common reason for being pulled over in 2005. Approximately 86% of stopped drivers felt they were pulled over for a legitimate reason.

In both 2002 and 2005, white, black, and Hispanic drivers were stopped by police at similar rates, while blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to be searched by police. About 5% of all stopped drivers were searched by police during a traffic stop. Police found evidence of criminal wrong-doing (such as drugs, illegal weapons, or other evidence of a possible crime) in 11.6% of searches in 2005.

Police issued tickets to more than half of all stopped drivers and arrested about 2.4% of drivers. Male drivers were 3 times more likely than female drivers to be arrested, and black drivers were twice as likely as white drivers to be arrested. Drivers stopped for speeding (71%) or for a seatbelt violation (74%) were more likely to be ticketed than drivers stopped for other reasons, such as an illegal turn or lane change (58%), a record check (34%), or a vehicle defect (32%).

Of the 43.5 million persons who had contact with police in 2005, an estimated 1.6% had force used or threatened against them during their most recent contact, a rate relatively unchanged from 2002 (1.5%). In both 2002 and 2005, blacks and Hispanics experienced police use of force at higher rates than whites. Of persons who had force used against them in 2005, an estimated 83% felt the force was excessive.

These findings are based on the Police-Public Contact Survey (PPCS), which documents contacts between police and the public age 16 or older, including details about the most recent contact during the year.

Face-to-face contacts with police were more common among males, whites, and younger residents

Males (21.1%) were more likely than females (17.2%) to have contact with police in 2005. Whites (20.2%) experienced contact with police officers at higher rates than blacks (16.5%) and Hispanics (15.8%). These differences are consistent with findings from the 2002 PPCS.

Whites made up 71% of the U. S. population age 16 or older but 76% of persons who had a police contact in 2005. Black residents age 16 or older made up about the same percentage of persons having police contact (10%) as their percentage of the U. S. population in 2005 (11%).

In general, younger persons had higher rates of contact with police than older persons. Persons ages 18 to 24 had the highest percentage of contact with police (29.3%) in 2005, while persons 65 or older had the lowest (8.3%). The 2002 survey also found that younger residents were more likely than older residents to have contact with police.

Among persons age 16 or older with at least one face-to-face police contact in 2005, the average age was 39. Half of all residents who had police contact were under 37 (not shown in table).

43.5 million residents had at least one contact with police in 2005

In 2005, 43.5 million persons had at least one contact with police. An estimated 71.5% had just one contact, 17.5% had two contacts, and the remaining 11% had 3 or more contacts with police in 2005. The total number of contacts was 71.1 million, with an average of 1.6 face-to-face contacts per resident.

Teenagers and young adults were twice as likely as older residents to have multiple contacts with police. An estimated 20% of persons age 55 or older who had contact with police reported having more than one contact in 2005 (not shown in table). By comparison, nearly 40% of persons age 16 to 24 who had contact with police indicated that they had multiple contacts.

The most common reason for contact with police was a traffic stop

Survey respondents who had face-to-face contact with police were asked to describe the nature of the contact. Respondents who had more than one contact with police were asked to describe only their most recent contact. In both 2002 and 2005, more than half of the contacts with police were the result of a traffic stop or accident.

The most common reason for contact was as a driver during a traffic stop, accounting for about 4 out of 10 contacts. Traffic accidents accounted for an additional 13% of all contacts in 2002 and 2005. The second most frequent reason for contact with police was to report a crime or problem, accounting for about 1 in every 4 contacts.

Of persons who had contact with police in 2005, 60% indicated their most recent contact was initiated by the police. The remaining 40% were self-initiated (not shown in table).

A majority of residents felt the police acted properly during face-to-face contact

Of persons who had contact with the police in 2005, about 9 in 10 felt the officer or officers behaved properly. Blacks (82.2%) were less likely than whites (91.6%) to feel the police acted properly during a contact. Racial differences in opinion about police behavior were not found across all types of contacts. No differences were found in the percentages of whites and blacks who felt the police behaved properly when helping with a traffic accident or providing assistance, such as giving directions. Blacks were less likely than whites to believe law enforcement acted properly during traffic stops and contacts occurring because police were investigating a crime or suspected the person of wrong-doing.

The likelihood of being stopped by police did not change from 2002 to 2005

An estimated 17.8 million persons age 16 or older indicated that their most recent contact with police in 2005 was as a driver pulled over in a traffic stop. These drivers represented 8.8% of the Nation’s 203 million drivers. Of persons who had more than one contact that year and whose most recent contact was not a traffic stop, an estimated 3 million additional drivers were stopped by police in 2005. The resulting estimated total number of drivers stopped by police at least once in 2005 was 21 million (or about 1 in 10 of the Nation’s drivers).

Overall, the likelihood of being stopped by police in 2002 and 2005 was about the same. In both years, male drivers were pulled over at higher rates than female drivers, and younger drivers were more likely than their older counterparts to be stopped. Also consistent from 2002 to 2005, white, black, and Hispanic drivers were stopped by police at similar rates.

Speeding was the reason for more than half of all traffic stops

When surveyed drivers were asked what reason the officer gave for the traffic stop, the most frequent reason was speeding, cited by more than half (53.3%) of stopped drivers. An additional 10.7% of drivers indicated they were stopped for a record check of some sort, such as a check of driver’s license, insurance coverage, or vehicle registration. Drivers were also stopped for vehicle defects, such as a burned out headlight or a loud muffler (9.6%), violations of stop sign or stop light (7.2%), an illegal turn or lane change (5.7%), and seatbelt violations (4.7%). An estimated 2.2% of stopped drivers indicated they were pulled over during a roadside check for drunk drivers.

Most stopped drivers (86%) felt they had been stopped for a legitimate reason

While the majority of stopped drivers felt police had a legitimate reason for stopping them, driver opinion was not consistent across racial/ethnic categories. White (87.6%) and Hispanic drivers (85.1%) were more likely than black drivers (76.8%) to feel the stop was legitimate.

Driver opinion also varied depending on the reason for the traffic stop. A smaller percentage of black drivers stopped because of a vehicle defect (66.5%) or a record check (72.2%) felt they were stopped for a legitimate reason compared to white drivers pulled over for the same reasons (90.5% and 91.8%, respectively).

Opinions about the legitimacy of the traffic stop were relatively uniform among white, black, and Hispanic drivers when the reason for the stop was a roadside check for drunk drivers, a seatbelt violation, or an illegal turn or lane change.

Police issued tickets to more than half of stopped drivers

As part of the 2005 survey, drivers were asked about the types of actions police took in order to resolve the traffic stop. Drivers were asked whether they were:

• given a verbal warning, the least serious type of police action resulting from a traffic stop
• issued a written warning, a more serious type of action than a verbal warning
• ticketed, the second most serious type of police action
• arrested, the most serious type of action police could take to resolve the traffic stop.

Of the 17.8 million drivers stopped by police in 2005, 17.7% reported that a verbal warning was the most serious action taken by police during the traffic stop. An additional 9.1% indicated that receiving a written warning was the most serious action taken.

Of the four types of action police could take to resolve the traffic stop, being ticketed was the most common, reported by 57.4% of stopped drivers. An estimated 2.4% of drivers reported being arrested. For approximately 13.5% of stopped drivers, no enforcement action was taken, meaning they did not receive a verbal or written warning nor were they ticketed or arrested.

The type of action taken by police varied depending on the reason police gave for making the traffic stop. Drivers stopped for a vehicle defect (14.9%) were more likely than speeders (10.1%) to receive a written warning. Speeders (71.1%) and drivers pulled over for a seatbelt violation (74.3%) had the greatest likelihood of receiving a ticket from police. Drivers stopped during a roadside check for drunk drivers (16.4%) were more likely to be arrested than drivers stopped for other reasons. Overall, the majority of drivers stopped during a roadside check (67.8%) indicated that no enforcement action was taken by police.

Note regarding findings of apparent disparities

The data in this report are from a survey in which U. S. residents were asked about their contacts with police and what police did during those contacts. Among other things, the report documents the percentage of U. S. residents who were pulled over in a traffic stop, and the percentage who were ticketed or searched or arrested. In some cases, such percentages were found to differ between males and females, between older and younger residents, and between the different races. For example, blacks were more likely than whites to be searched during a traffic stop.

However, the apparent disparities documented in this report do not constitute proof that police treat people differently along demographic lines. Any of these disparities might be explained by countless other factors and circumstances that were not taken into account in the analysis.

Police took more serious actions during traffic stops involving males and younger drivers

Male drivers were more likely than female drivers to experience more serious police actions following a traffic stop. Males (3.2%) were nearly 3 times more likely than females (1.1%) to be arrested. Males (59.2%) were also more likely than females (54.4%) to be ticketed.

Police actions taken during a traffic stop were not uniform across racial and ethnic categories. Black drivers (4.5%) were twice as likely as white drivers (2.1%) to be arrested during a traffic stop, while Hispanic drivers (65%) were more likely than white (56.2%) or black (55.8%) drivers to receive a ticket. In addition, whites (9.7%) were more likely than Hispanics (5.9%) to receive a written warning, while whites (18.6%) were more likely than blacks (13.7%) to be verbally warned by police.

Younger drivers experienced more serious types of actions by police than older drivers:

• Drivers in their twenties (4.8%) were more likely than drivers in their thirties (1.9%) and forties (1.6%) to be arrested during a traffic stop.
• Teenage drivers (60.7%) and drivers in their twenties (58.8%) and thirties (60.8%) were more likely than drivers in their fifties (52.4%) and drivers age 60 or older (50.4%) to be ticketed by police during a traffic stop.

More than half of searches were conducted with the consent of the driver

More than half (57.6%) of all searches conducted in 2005 were by consent. Consent searches occurred because either the officer asked permission to perform a search and the driver then granted it, or the driver told the officer he/she could conduct a search without the officer first asking for permission.

The remaining 42.4% of searches occurred without the consent of the driver. Searches conducted without consent may occur because:

1. the police officer had not asked permission before conducting the search;
2. the officer had asked but the driver refused;
3. the search was conducted pursuant to an arrest

About 1 in 10 searches during a traffic stop uncovered evidence of a possible crime

In 11.6% of searches conducted during a traffic stop in 2005, police found drugs, an illegal weapon, open containers of alcohol, or other illegal items. Consent and nonconsent searches turned up evidence of criminal wrong-doing at similar rates.

Rate of police use of force during a traffic stop remained stable from 2002 to 2005

Stopped drivers were asked whether, in their opinion, police had used or threatened to use force against them during the traffic stop. An estimated 0.8% of the 17.8 million persons whose most recent contact with police in 2005 was as a driver in a traffic stop indicated police used or threatened to use force against them (not shown in table). In 2002, the percentage was 1.1%.

Percent of persons experiencing force during a police contact was about the same in 2002 and 2005

All persons who had contact with police, whether as a driver in a traffic stop or for some other reason, were asked if the police officer (s) used or threatened to use physical force against them during the contact. The survey did not define force for the respondent. If persons reported more than one contact that year, they were asked if police used or threatened force against them during just their most recent contact.

An estimated 707, 520 persons age 16 or older had force used against them during their most recent contact with police in 2005. ***In the report “use of force” includes threat of force unless otherwise indicated. *** This estimate is about 1.6% of the 43.5 million people reporting face-to-face police contact during 2005. The percentage of contacts involving police use of force was relatively unchanged from 2002 to 2005.

The likelihood of being searched during a traffic stop was unchanged between 2002 and 2005

In both 2002 and 2005, about 5% of stopped drivers were searched by police during the traffic stop. The 5% includes searches of the vehicle only, the driver only, and both the vehicle and the driver.

In both years, male drivers were more likely than female drivers to be searched by police during a traffic stop.

In 2005 black (9.5%) and Hispanic (8.8%) motorists stopped by police were searched at higher rates than whites (3.6%). The likelihood of experiencing a search did not change for whites, blacks, or Hispanics from 2002 to 2005.

Drivers under the age of 30 (8.4%) had a greater likelihood than drivers age 30 or older (2.7) of being frisked or having their vehicle searched. In 2005 drivers in the two youngest age categories — teenage drivers (9.5%) and drivers in their twenties (8.1%) — were more likely than drivers in their thirties (3.3%), forties (3.3%), and fifties (2.3%) to experience some type of search.

Due to sample size limitations, analysis could not be done on the likelihood of being searched by the reason for the traffic stop and gender, race, and age differences. See Appendix for more information on sample size on the BJS web site at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

In the 2005 PPCS all persons were asked if the police used or threatened to use force against them at any time during the year. An estimated 991, 930 persons reported that they experienced force or the threat of force by police at least once in 2005.

Among residents who experienced force, 83% felt it was excessive

Most (82.9%) of the 707, 520 people experiencing force in 2005 felt the force used by police was excessive. Whites (84.3%) involved in force incidents were not more likely than blacks (81.5%) to feel the force was excessive. Among Hispanics who had force used against them, 85.6% felt it was excessive. The differences between estimates for whites, blacks, and Hispanics were not statistically significant.

Overall, 14.8% of persons who experienced force were injured during the incident (not shown in table).

The majority (86.9%) of persons involved in police use of force incidents in 2005 felt the police acted improperly (not shown in table). Of those who felt the police acted improperly, 13.1% said they filed a complaint against the police.

Male, black, and younger residents more likely to experience force

The differences found among gender, race, and age groups who experienced force in 2005 were consistent with the 2002 PPCS. Among the persons who had police contact in 2005, females (1. 0%) were less likely than males (2.2%) to have had contact with police that resulted in force. Males accounted for a larger percentage (72.4%) of contacts involving force compared to their percentage of all contacts (53.6%).

Blacks (4.4%) and Hispanics (2.3%) were more likely than whites (1.2%) to experience use of force during contact with police in 2005. Blacks accounted for 1 out of 10 contacts with police but 1 out of 4 contacts where force was used.

Persons age 16 to 29 (2.8%) who had contact with police were more likely than those over age 29 (1. 0%) to have had force used against them. Persons age 16 to 29 made up a smaller percentage of persons who had a police contact (34.5%) compared to the percentage of persons experiencing force during a contact (60.3%). The median age of those experiencing force was 26.

About 80% of contacts involving force were initiated by police

Persons whose contact was police-initiated (such as a traffic stop) were more likely than those whose contact was not initiated by the police (such as asking police for assistance) to experience police use of force (2.2% versus 0.8%) (not shown in table). Police-initiated contacts were 60.4% of the 43.5 million contacts in 2005, but 81.4% of the 707, 520 contacts involving police use of force.

Persons whom police suspected of criminal wrong-doing or who had contact through a criminal investigation represented a relatively large percentage of the 707, 520 force incidents, as compared to their representation of all persons with contact in 2005. Residents suspected of criminal wrong-doing by police accounted for a percentage of the force incidents (23.9%) that was nearly 9 times higher than their portion of all contacts (2.8%). Persons whose contact occurred because of a criminal investigation accounted for a percentage of force incidents (21.3%), almost 4 times higher than their percentage of all contacts (5.6%).

Over half of police use of force incidents involved physical force

Residents who experienced force were asked to describe the type of force used. Among the estimated 707, 520 persons who reported that the police used force against them:

• 55% indicated the police actually used some type of physical force, such as pushing, pointing a gun, or using chemical spray
• 27.5% reported force was threatened but not actually employed
• 10.1% indicated the officer (s) shouted or cursed at them but did not use or threaten physical force

An estimated 16.8% of persons experiencing force reported that they did something to provoke the officer to use force, such as threatening the police or resisting arrest.

About half of persons who had force used against them were searched by police

In 2005 more than half (54.1%) of those who had force used against them by police were searched either before or after the force occurred. Blacks (53.4%) were not more likely than whites (48.5%) to be searched during contacts that involved force. Hispanics (71.9%) were more likely than whites (48.5%) but not more likely than blacks (53.4%) to be searched during contacts involving force. About 8% of persons who experienced force reported that police found illegal items (such as drugs, an open alcohol container, or a weapon) during the contact (not in a table).

About a third of force incidents resulted in arrest

About 3 in 10 persons who had force used or threatened against them in 2005 were arrested during the incident. Less than half (41.2%) of persons experiencing force were handcuffed during the incident. The higher percentage of persons handcuffed versus arrested during force incidents may be an indication that police use handcuffs to detain people during contact and release them without making an arrest.

Methodology

The 2005 Police-Public Contact Survey was conducted for the Bureau of Justice Statistics during the last 6 months of 2005 by the U. S. Census Bureau as a supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS). The NCVS sample consisted of 80, 237 individuals age 16 or older. About 20% of the NCVS sample, or 16, 294 individuals, were excluded from the 2005 PPCS as noninterviews or as proxy interviews.

Noninterviews (14, 757) included respondents not available for the interview, those who refused to participate, and non-English speaking respondents. (Unlike NCVS interviews, PPCS interviews are only conducted in English). The remainder (1, 537) were proxy interviews. A proxy interview may be conducted when a person is unable for physical, mental, or other reasons to participate. BJS staff determined that proxy interviewees would have difficulty describing the details of any contacts between police and the sampled respondent and decided to exclude them.

In total, the PPCS interviewed 63, 943 persons, which represents an 80% response rate among eligible individuals (compared to an overall response rate of 87% for the NCVS).

Among the PPCS interviews, 23, 761 (37%) were conducted in person and 40, 182 (63%) by telephone. The PPCS sample in 2005, after adjustment for nonresponse, was weighted to produce a national estimate of 228, 040, 117 persons age 16 or older.

Data collection

Respondents in the 2005 Police-Public Contact Survey were directly interviewed to determine how many had a face-to-face contact with police during the previous 12 months. Data on the number and nature of face-to-face contacts with police were based solely on the personal accounts of these PPCS respondents. Official police records on contacts between police and the public were not used.

Statistical significance

In comparisons indicated in the text, an explicit or implied difference indicates a test of significance was conducted, and the difference was significant at the . 05 level. Certain differences were not significant at the . 05 level but were significant at the .10 level. The terms “somewhat, ” “some indication” or “slightly” refer to differences significant at the .10 level. The report also indicates that some comparisons were not different, meaning the difference between the two estimates was not significant at either the . 05 or .10 levels.

Standard errors for the percent of drivers stopped by police and the percent of persons who experienced force by demographic characteristics are provided on page 11. See Appendix for other tables available on the BJS web site at

Racial designations

In 1997 the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) introduced new guidelines for the collection and reporting of race and ethnicity data in government surveys. These methodological changes were implemented for all demographic surveys as of January 1, 2003. Individuals after that date were allowed to choose more than one racial category. In prior years individuals were asked to select a single primary race.

In 2005 the racial categories changed from previous Police-Public Contact Surveys to separately identify residents of two or more races. Racial categories presented in this report now consist of the following: white only, black only, other race only (American Indian, Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian, or other Pacific Islander if only one of these races is given), and two or more races (all persons of any race indicating two or more races). Because about 0.7% of survey respondents identified two or more races, the impact on the rates of police contact for each race is relatively small.

Prior to 2003, individuals were also asked whether they were of Hispanic origin before being asked about their race. In 2005 respondents were asked directly if they were Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino. Individuals who indicated they are of Hispanic origin are categorized under the heading Hispanic or Latino.

Comparing estimates from previous Police-Public Contact Surveys

The Police-Public Contact Survey has been conducted four times: 1996, 1999, 2002, and 2005. In this report, comparisons are exclusively between estimates from the 2002 and the 2005 surveys. See the Appendix for information on the reasons for limiting comparisons to these two years available on the BJS web site at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/

Other BJS reports on police-public contacts

Each of the following publications is available on the BJS website.

• Police Use of Force: Collection of National Data, November 1997;
• Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings from the 1999 National Survey, February 2001;
• Characteristics of Drivers Stopped by Police, 1999, March 2002;
• Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings from the 2002 National Survey, April 2005;
• Characteristics of Drivers Stopped by Police, 2002, June 2006;

Comparing estimates from previous Police-Public Contact Surveys

There are several reasons for limiting comparisons to findings from the 2002 and 2005 surveys. Changes were made to the data collection instrument following the 1999 survey to reduce the overall response burden to survey participants. These changes affected estimates of the reason for contact with police, in particular the number of drivers stopped. In 1999, respondents were asked whether they had been a driver stopped by police at any time during the previous 12 months. Any respondent who had been pulled over in a traffic stop was then included in the count of the number of drivers stopped by police, regardless of whether the traffic stop was their most recent contact with police.

In 2002 and 2005, the survey was changed so that respondents were asked only about their most recent contact with police during the previous 12 months. Respondents whose most recent face-to-face contact was not a traffic stop, but who had been pulled over by police earlier in the year, were not included in the count of the number of drivers stopped. Due to this change in the survey, the estimated number of drivers stopped by police was smaller in 2002 and 2005 than in 1999. Estimates of the characteristics of drivers stopped by police, such as the percentage of drivers searched or the reasons drivers were stopped, were unaffected by these changes, and remain comparable between 1999, 2002, and 2005.

Following the 1999 survey, the measurement of the number of drivers in the United States was modified and the estimate of the likelihood of being stopped by police in 1999 is not directly comparable to estimates in 2002 and 2005. The denominator used to calculate the likelihood of being stopped by police was “licensed drivers” in 1999, as estimated by the U. S. Department of Transportation’s 1995 Nationwide Personal Transportation Survey. In 2002 and 2005 the denominator was “drivers in the United States, ” as estimated directly from responses to additional questions included in the 2002 and the 2005 Police-Public Contact Surveys. The denominator change was made to account for all persons who drive, licensed and not licensed, to better approximate the number of persons at risk of being stopped by police. Excluded from the new denominator were licensed drivers who indicated that they never drive.

About the authors of this report

The Bureau of Justice Statistics is the statistical agency of the U. S. Department of Justice. Jeffrey L. Sedgwick is the Director.

Matthew R. Durose and Erica L. Smith wrote this report, under the supervision of Patrick A. Langan, Ph. D. Mallory Nobles, BJS intern, provided statistical assistance. Tina Dorsey edited the report, under the supervision of Doris J. James. Jayne Robinson prepared the report for final printing.

Editors Note: Please note this report is not specificially about Clarksville, TN or Montgomery County. It is instead a generally commentary about the system of Public Safety nationwide.

The State of Tennessee has sued to remove Danny J. Crosby as the Mayor of Coopertown, Tennessee.

Many Clarksville, Tennessee residents have learned the hard way about this sleepy little town of 3,176 residents. The town operates several infamous speed traps on Interstate 24, U.S. 431, and State highway 49. The city’s police budget has nearly tripled, from $155,880 during the last year to $451,550 this fiscal year. The town budget plans on between $400,000 and $800,000 in traffic court revenues, comprising over one third of the city budget. This percentage is much higher than that of many larger U.S. cities.

Mayor Crosby is accused of misusing the city’s power, disgracing the office of the mayor, and multiple violations of the public trust including:

• Running a speed trap
• Ordering police to profile out of town residents, Hispanics, and US Military Personnel from Fort Campbell who would be less likely to contest the tickets
• Racism and fostering an atmosphere of racial intolerance
• Violating the civil rights of state residents
• Planting false evidence
• Ordering unlawful arrests of his political enemies
• Violating the state open-meeting laws
• Violating child labor laws
• Threatening and intimidating local citizens

Coopertown is located 25 miles north of Nashville and 20 miles south of Clarksville on Interstate 24 in Robertson County Tennessee. Coopertown encompasses nearly 25 square miles.The City of Coopertown has no property tax. Local services are paid for by funds raised from sales taxes and traffic fines. The city offers 24 hour a day police protection, road maintenance, and building and codes enforcement. Fire service is contracted out to Pleasant View Volunteer Fire Department.

In January 2006 the Coopertown PD had 11 full time and one part time officer. They have eight police vehicles assigned to the department. It was also stated that they patrol I-24 4 miles on the east bound lanes, and one mile westbound.

Tennessee State Representatives have acknowledged that speed traps are a serious problem in Tennessee. Legislation has been proposed, which would require that safety be the only reason for reducing speed limits, prohibit towns from annexing land to gain jurisdiction over interstate highways, and ban local law enforcement officers from from policing the interstates. They understand that police speed traps damage the image of Tennessee held by tourists, and annoy commuters.