In our society an innocent person does not have to fear the intrusion of government into their lives. They won’t be followed by dark men with dark intentions unless of course they commit a crime. Automated enforcement cameras will change our free society to one where everyone is constantly watched, a potential criminal.

We all feel a guilty pleasure when we see someone who proceeds through a signaled  intersection while we stop, getting pulled over for a ticket. There is even a term for it… Schadenfreude: Happiness at the misfortune of others. While it might feel good, these cameras come at a cost: your money, your civil rights, and your civil liberties.

The first cameras have not yet been installed, however, city officials hungry for easy revenue have announced that they already plan to expand their camera programs. They have already authorized red-light cameras, and are now considering installing mobile and fixed speed cameras, and stop sign cameras. These cameras don’t stop accidents; they simply allow the city to profit from technical violations  the vast majority of which, do not result in accidents. The sad thing is these cameras have a rather nasty side affect, they increase accidents, damage, injuries, and fatalities. Don’t take my word for it, go and read the studies for yourself!

Why stop there when enforcment cameras can be used for many other purposes?

Current speed cameras measure your speed at a fixed point. Newer speed cameras can track you between cameras and measure your speed over time. If they decide you momentarily exceeded the speed limit, they can ticket you. They can check the depth of your tire treads, and ticket you if your tires don’t meet their criteria.  I imagine that it will not be too long until they figure out how to check to see if your car’s window tint is a touch too dark.

Cameras can read your license plate as you drive by and charge you a fee for driving when big brother doesn’t want you to.

Cameras exist to detect gun shots, loud arguments, party noise, or that TV that momentarily goes a bit too loud when obnoxious advertisers crank the volume level up during a commercial break.

Cameras can be used to allow the police to track potential criminals, or a crooked politician can use them to track their political opponents every move, all without even leaving their desk. These traffic enforcement cameras can recognize your face and automatically track and record your every move and association, even if you are happen to be in another state, or clear across the country.

Cameras can monitor your behavior and if its algorithms thinks that you are acting in a suspicious manner it can then notify the police. I guess we all better start practicing how to be normal!

Cameras can be placed on residential streets to peer through your windows into your living room or bedroom.  Heck cameras can even peer through your walls,  or clothing.

Check out this video and you will see where this can end up, if we idly stand by and do nothing.

Click here to view the embedded video.

The sad thing is all this can be done without a judge issuing a single warrant.

We have all seen movies like Demolition Man where fleeting moments of profanity are instantly issued fines. Or Tom Cruise’s movie Minority Report where intrusive surveillance is constant and police robots are allowed to enter your home at any time without any repercussions.

This is the future we face people, however we stand at a pivotal point in time where we still can say no.

Take Action

Call your City Council members, the Mayor, your State Legislators, and your Congressmen and tell them all over and over again that we don’t want our hard earned liberty giving way to a constant surveillance society! It’s time to ban automated enforcement cameras before they get entrenched.

The fact is that Red-Light and Speed cameras result in the roads where they are present becoming less safe. You are more likely to be injured or killed at a intersection after these cameras are put into place than you ever were before. Read this news report, and the study which follows it, then be sure to contact your city council member and tell them in no uncertain terms that you strongly oppose their dangerous revenue generating scheme.

Here’s a recent real life example from the Kingsport Times News reprinted with their permission. Some reports say this happened at a red-light camera intersection.

Video report – Wreck at Stone-Clinchfield intersection

Kingsport city firefighters worked to extricate an injured person from a blue Honda that tried to stop for a traffic light Tuesday at the intersection of Stone Drive and Bloomingdale/Clinchfield Street.The Honda stopped short, and a tractor-trailer behind it was unable to stop in time before hitting the vehicle.Two people were transported to the hospital. Officer Dale Farmer said their injuries were minor, and each were released Tuesday afternoon.

Photo by Erica Yoon.

There’s a video on their site as well, and I recommend everyone watch it. If Clarksville succeeds in putting into place red-light cameras this may well end up being you, or someone you love.

This is a study done by Professor Barbara Langland-Orban for the Florida Public Health Review a a joint electronic publication of the University of South Florida College of Public Health (USF COPH) and the Florida Public Health Association (FPHA).

Red Light Running Cameras: Would Crashes, Injuries and Automobile Insurance Rates Increase (Florida Public Health Review, 3/7/2008)

Introduction

Running a red light can cause severe traffic crashes especially when one vehicle runs into the side of another (i.e., an angle crash). Red light cameras photograph violators who are sent traffic tickets by mail. Intuitively, cameras appear to be a good idea. However, comprehensive studies conclude cameras actually increase crashes and injuries, providing a safety argument not to install them.

The National Motorists Association (NMA) represents driver interests and opposes cameras. In addition to concluding cameras do not improve safety, the NMA is concerned that local governments will not use effective methods to reduce red light running when earning money from cameras. For example, lengthening yellow light timings at traffic signals is effective in reducing red light running (NMA, 2008).

Nearly 80% of red light running occurs in the first second after the light changes (Office of the Majority Leader [OML], 2001). In addition, highspeed red light camera technology can identify splitsecond technical violations that are not visible to the human eye. Police in one community concluded that nearly 90% of infractions at a trial camera were splitsecond violations visible only to the camera lens, which would not result in a ticket from an officer(theNewspaper.com, 2006).

The majority of the red light running safety issue can be resolved through inexpensive engineering remedies that address infractions in the first second after the light changes. Inexpensive interventions include lengthening yellow light timings and/or adding a brief all-red light interval, which permits traffic to clear the intersection prior to releasing cross traffic (Federal Highway Administration and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration [FHWA/NHTSA], 2003).

Camera fines have raised large amounts of money for cities and counties. San Diego, California, collected nearly $30 million in 18 months, with one camera alone generating almost $7 million. Smaller cities have also raised millions of dollars annually from cameras. Some jurisdictions have been accused of setting shorter yellow light traffic signal timings at camera intersections in order to increase tickets, thereby collecting more money from fines. Insufficient yellow light timings can create a dilemma zone where the distance is too short to stop, yet proceeding into the intersection results in running a red light (OML, 2001). Lending support to this concern, hundreds of camera citations in San Diego were dismissed after a judge concluded improper timings were set by the camera vendor (Fields, 2001).

The primary advocate for cameras is the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS, 2007; Federal Highway Administration, 2008). As the IIHS openly admits, they are wholly funded by automobile insurers. However, their major study, concluding cameras improve safety (Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002), has been criticized for research design flaws and not actually measuring changes in crashes and injuries at camera intersections (Burkey & Obeng, 2004). While insurers may not set out to increase crashes and injuries, increases in crashes and injuries indirectly contribute to automobile insurance’s performance as a growth industry. Increases in crashes can raise the risk rating of drivers in a community, which can lead to disproportionately higher automobile insurance premiums, and, subsequently, rising profits for insurers.

At present, Florida statutes do not permit red light camera evidence to be used as the sole basis for ticketing drivers for violating the law (Crist, 2005). Legislation to permit camera citations has been proposed since the 1990s, but none has passed to date. This paper explains:

1. red light running trends in Florida;

2. effective solutions to reduce red light running;

3. findings from major camera evaluations;

4. examples of flawed evaluations;

5. the automobile insurance financial interest in cameras; and

6. the increased likelihood of even higher crash and injury rates if cameras are used in Florida due to the high percent of elderly drivers and passengers.

Is Red Light Running a Growing Problem in Florida?

Traffic fatalities due to red light running are not increasing and have averaged 110 per year since 1998, accounting for less than 4% of Florida’s 3,000 annual traffic fatalities. Injuries from red light running crashes have steadily decreased since 1998, as have property damage-only crashes from red light running (Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, 2006). More importantly, the injury rate from red light running crashes has plummeted by a third in less than a decade, as illustrated in the graph. The statistics and graph suggest red light running is declining in Florida in the absence of red light camera use.

What Solutions Are Effective in Reducing Red Light Running?

Whereas some red light running may be intentional, particularly in traffic congestion, it can also be unintentional and due to circumstantial factors. Contributing environmental factors include yellow light timings that are set too short at traffic signals, obstacles that block a driver’s view of the traffic signal, and wet roads. The first recommended intervention at problem intersections is to conduct an engineering analysis, which will identify why red light running occurs. Intersection improvements should then be made in response to the findings (FHWA/NHTSA, 2003; Hemenway, 2001). For example, studies show that new traffic signals can reduce traffic fatalities by 50 percent, as they can increase visibility of the signal (TRIP, 2005). The following engineering countermeasures are recommended to reduce red light running (FHWA/NHTSA, 2003):

• Improve signal head visibility by increasing size or adding signal heads where one signal head is used for multiple lanes and may be blocked from view.

• Address east-west roads where sun angles silhouette the traffic sign head and add back plates to enhance visibility.

• Set appropriate yellow light time intervals that allow vehicles to clear the intersection or safely stop that is consistent with the speed limit, road grade and intersection width.

• Add a brief all-red light clearance interval to allow traffic in the intersection to clear prior to releasing cross traffic.

• Add intersection warning signs or advanced yellow flashing lights or reduce the approach speed to the intersection.

• Coordinate traffic signals to optimize traffic flow, eliminating interruptions.

• Remove on-site parking near intersections to increase visibility of pedestrians and cross traffic.

• Repair malfunctioning lights and avoid unnecessarily long cycle timings.

If a problem persists after intersection re-engineering, the FHWA and NHTSA (2003) advise the next steps are an education campaign and traditional police enforcement.

What Is Known About Cameras and Safety?

Major evaluations were conducted in Greensboro, North Carolina; Virginia; and the Canadian province of Ontario. The studies used multiple years of before-and-after data at camera intersections and comparison (no camera) intersections resulting in consistent findings. Camera intersections were associated with a significant increase in crashes. Increased rear-end crashes were a particular problem and may occur as drivers attempt to stop abruptly in order to avoid a ticket. The studies also found cameras were associated with increased injury crashes or crashes with possible injuries.

The Greensboro evaluation was conducted by the Urban Transit Institute at the North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University using 57 months of data (Burkey & Obeng, 2004). The study concluded that in many ways “the evidence points toward the installation of RLCs [red light cameras] as a detriment to safety.” Cameras were associated with:

• A significant increase (40%) in accident rates;

• A significant increase (40-50%) in possible injury crashes;

• No decrease in severe crashes.

The Virginia Transportation Research Council (Garber, Miller, Abel, Eslambolchi & Korukonda, 2007) analyzed camera programs in five jurisdictions using seven years of data. The study concluded their findings “cannot be used to justify the widespread installation of cameras because they are not universally effective.” They used a comprehensive statistical method of analysis (i.e., Empirical Bayes) that found cameras were associated with:

• A significant increase (29%) in total crashes;

• A significant increase (20%) in angle crashes;

• A significant increase (42%) in rear-end crashes, which did not decrease over time;

• A significant increase in injury crashes (18%), with the impact on injury severity reported as “too close to call”;

• Increases in crash costs.

A study conducted for the Ministry of Transportation in Ontario by Synectics Transportation Consultants (2003) evaluated two interventions (cameras and stepped-up police enforcement) in six jurisdictions following a public information campaign. Camera intersections had a:

• 16% increase in crashes, compared to an 8% increase at comparison intersections;

• 2% increase in injury or fatal crashes, compared to 10% and 12% decreases respectively at stepped-up police enforcement and comparison intersections.

Why Do Some Studies Conclude Cameras Reduce Crashes and Injuries?

All research studies are susceptible to design flaws, especially observational (i.e. nonexperimental) studies. Some of the major studies concluding reductions in red light running have exhibited such design flaws. One of these was conducted by the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) and a second was funded by the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). Both are explained below.

In the IIHS study, researchers compared Oxnard, California, which installed cameras, with three towns that did not. The first criticism of this study’s design is that camera intersections were not separately analyzed. Instead, crash and injury counts at Oxnard’s 11 camera intersections were added with all 125 signalized intersections in Oxnard (Retting & Kyrychenko, 2002). Thus, the study actually compared differences in crash and injury growth rates between intersections with and without traffic signals, and not between signalized intersections with and without cameras. A further criticism of this study is that the conclusions drawn from the statistical analysis were incorrectly reported. When the results were correctly analyzed for statistical significance, no change in total crashes could be substantiated (Burkey & Obeng, 2004; Kyrychenko & Retting, 2004).

The FHWA study (Council, Persaud, Eccles, Lyon and Griffith, 2005) evaluated seven jurisdictions in multiple states. The analysis concluded cameras were associated with decreased angle crashes and injures. The university professor who co-directed this study and provided the methodological ideas has also conducted research for the IIHS (Persaud, 2007; Persaud, Retting & Lord, 2001; Persaud, Hauer, Retting, Vallurupalli & Mucsi, 1997). The research design and reporting concerns are as follows.

• The researchers listed 15 geographic areas with camera programs. However, only seven areas were selected for the analysis because the researchers concluded “significant effects are likely for all crash severities” in these jurisdictions. The decision to selectively (non-randomly) choose among the 15 areas increases the chance of incorrectly favoring one conclusion over another (camera effectiveness or ineffectiveness). Three areas excluded by the researchers were included in the major studies from Virginia and Greensboro, North Carolina, which did not find reductions in angle crashes.

• The researchers called this a “before-andafter” study, yet it appears they did not compare crashes and injuries at intersections before and after cameras were installed. They did not report using the before period data in estimating expected crashes for the after period. Instead, the study made estimates of expected crashes and injuries for the period after cameras were installed using non-camera intersections. Also, counts of crashes and injuries from the before period were not reported in the results.

• In estimating crashes for the period after cameras were installed, the analysis excluded important factors that are known to affect intersection crashes. Changes attributed to cameras could actually occur from these excluded factors, such as differences in yellow light timings and speed limits.

• Although the Methods section identified six types of crashes (for example, red light running crashes), findings were reported for only angle and rear end crashes. Changes in crashes and injuries for the other types, including red light running crashes, and changes in total crashes and injuries were not revealed. This also renders the economic analysis incomplete since it did not include changes in total crashes and injuries.

• Instead of reporting the full results of the statistical analyses, only an example with made-up numbers was provided.

• Crash and injury counts were not reported by intersection or jurisdiction. As such, it is unknown where the favorable experiences attributed to cameras actually occurred. Correct reporting of research findings requires providing sufficient detail to allow other researchers to validate conclusions. It is impossible to replicate this study or to reanalyze the findings.

The public health policy implications are stark. People who are not trained in research methods are unlikely to identify methodological flaws. As such, these studies have been used in decision making. For example, the FHWA conclusions were presented in a legislative analysis of a Florida red light camera bill, along with IIHS research that referenced their Oxnard study (Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis, 2007).

Of particular importance is the comparison of the research methods performed by the studies that find at best no benefit due to cameras, or at worst increased harm, since these studies did not have similar research design flaws. The studies finding no safety benefit to cameras more readily provided details of their methodology with their appropriate application. They provide sample data that were actually analyzed and reported, and not irrelevant and made-up. These studies correctly take into account statistical error rates and margins of error of their findings. Also, they tend not to pick and choose sample data that support their conclusions, while discarding data that may potentially dilute desired findings.

Another potential research design issue is crash data. Local governments have used changes in violations or profitability as proof of successful camera performance instead of using changes in crashes and injuries. This may occur because local governments do not have accurate counts of crashes before and after cameras are installed. For example, Florida law does not require law enforcement officers to write crash reports for most property damage-only crashes (Florida Statutes, 2007). This allows for large differences in the percent of crashes reported. If all crashes are not reported, it is not possible to correctly determine changes in crash rates associated with red light cameras. An Australian study completed by Andreassen (1995) concluded cameras offered “no demonstrated value as an effective countermeasure”, but also identified concerns about the reliability of lists of accidents at camera sites. The importance of having good data was emphasized.

Why Might Insurers Support Cameras If They Increase Crashes and Costs?

More crashes lead to higher insurance premiums, leading to higher profits, which in turn lead to increases in insurance stock prices. In the absence of crashes, automobile insurance would become superfluous. This is not to say that automobile insurers actively seek to increase crashes, but to point out that an important component of insurance revenue growth is actual and perceived levels of “risk.” Similarly, the tobacco industry has emphasized revenue growth by increasing cigarette sales while downplaying the impact on the public’s health.

With automobile insurance, declining crash rates imply lower risk. In theory, insurance premiums should decline with fewer crashes, thereby reducing insurance revenues. Higher crash rates suggest higher risk; justifying higher premiums and profits. Due to the pricing methods used, automobile insurers do not have a financial incentive to lower crash rates or perceptions of risk.

Also, automobile insurance companies can profit if camera tickets are moving violations that add points to a driver’s license. Moving violation tickets allow insurers to charge higher premiums while incurring no additional cost. For example, if Florida’s proposed camera legislation from 2005 or 2006 had passed, camera citations would be moving violations under the existing red light running statute. Cameras would have photographed the license plate of a vehicle violating a red light and then the vehicle owner would have received a $250 ticket plus 4-points on their driver’s license (Florida House of Representatives [FHR], 2005; FHR, 2006). Even when tickets from red light cameras are not moving violations, an increase in moving violation tickets is still expected from the increase in crashes.

From 2000 to 2004, Florida moved up five spots to become the 6th most expensive state in which to insure a vehicle. A significant increase in moving violation tickets occurred from 2000 to 2004; along with a large increase in automobile insurance premiums. Statewide, automobile insurance premiums increased from $8.7 billion in 2000 to nearly $14 billion in 2004. Automobile insurers paid 73¢ on every premium dollar in 2000, versus 61¢ in 2004. This means the large increase in tickets was associated with increased insurance revenues and profits, while Florida’s crash rate remained the same (Florida Statistical Abstract [FSA], 2001; FSA, 2006; National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2004).

Are Any Camera Issues Unique to Florida?

Cameras could create an even larger increase in crashes and injuries in Florida since the state has the highest percent of elderly population in the U.S. The elderly have slower average reaction times and may be less likely to stop abruptly as other drivers do so at camera intersections. Further, the elderly are at greater risk for an injury or fatality when a crash occurs due to anatomic and physiologic changes that occur with aging and from the common use of blood thinners that increase the rate of bleeding. In the lower range of injury severity, the death rate for elderly patients hospitalized from a motor vehicle crash is three times higher (4.6%) than adults under 65 years of age (1.5%) (Pracht, Langland-Orban, Orban & Flint, 2007).

In 2001, Florida led the nation with the most older drivers killed in traffic crashes (268 fatalities), a 70% increase in just 10 years. In addition, Florida had the most traffic fatalities where an older driver was involved in the crash (456 fatalities). Among older drivers, 50% of traffic fatalities occur at intersections, which is more than twice the rate for younger drivers. Improved intersection design is known to reduce errors among older drivers. The Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) is a leader in designing state roads that accommodate elderly drivers. The state’s elder driver program has designed and re-constructed state highways and streets to improve safety for older drivers (TRIP, 2003). In 2006, the FDOT Secretary was asked to allow cameras on state roads. The Secretary responded that more research was needed due to the large increase in rear-end collisions and recommended engineering solutions (Stutler, 2006).

Conclusions and Recommendations

The theory behind red light cameras as potentially effective is that they rely on deterring red light running primarily through punishment of a specific driving behavior and secondarily by changing drivers’ experience. By definition, the punishable behavior and resulting potentially harmful action will already have taken place when a ticket is issued. In other words, the crash, injury, and mortality risks do not change immediately, if at all. In contrast, the engineering solutions described above produce immediate reductions in red light running and potential crashes. Thus, even if red light cameras could be effective in the long run, which is debatable, they are associated with an added cost, consisting of fines, crashes and injuries that could have been avoided by using engineering solutions, which are effective in both the short term and the long run.

Because the rigorous and robust studies conclude cameras are associated with increased crashes and costs, any economic analysis of cameras should include these newly generated costs to the public. Indirect costs to the public are usually not considered in the calculation of total revenues and profits generated from red light cameras.

Cities and counties should follow the state’s lead and likewise pursue engineering improvements to enhance intersection safety for all drivers and passengers. Proven engineering practices and counter-measures can reduce crashes and injuries due to red light running, as well as other causes of intersection crashes. A public health approach to improved intersection engineering is particularly needed since 26% of Florida’s traffic fatalities occur at intersections (with and without traffic signals), in contrast to 18% nationally (NHTSA, 2005). This means that more than 22% of traffic fatalities in Florida occur at intersections for reasons other than red light running, as red light constitutes less than 4% of total traffic fatalities.

Further, red light cameras are an inefficient means to raise revenue for local and state governments and can disadvantage the state’s economy. This occurs from the significant amount of funds, paid by local drivers, that ultimately accrues to private in-state and out-of-state special interests from camera use, rather than fully accruing to local and/or state governments. If cameras are used in Florida, a portion of ticket fines (in essence, royalties) can accrue to the camera vendors in perpetuity, which are located in other states and countries. Likewise, the increase in crashes and probable injuries would result in automobile insurance rate increases, which could affect all drivers in a community due to the pricing methods used by insurers. A portion of the insurance increase would be returned to certain business interests in the state; for example, in the form of higher insurance agency commissions and payments to automobile repair shops, hospitals, doctors, and rental car companies. However, a portion of the insurance increase would accrue to out-of-state interests, such as automobile parts manufacturers and, more importantly, to out-of-state insurance corporate accounts. Thus, red light cameras result in fines and insurance increases that would transfer disposable income from Florida drivers to private businesses in and out of the state, in addition to local and/or state governments. It is not surprising that out-of-state special interests, such as camera vendors and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, advocate for camera use.

Finally, cities, counties, and the state should be very cautious in using traffic safety information from the automobile insurance industry. Insurance financial goals are to increase their revenues and profits, which do not necessarily include reducing traffic crashes, injuries or fatalities. Also, public policy should avoid conflicts of interest that enhance revenues for government and private interests at the risk of public safety.

References

Andreassen, D. (1995, February). A long term study of red light cameras and accidents (Research Report ARR 261). Australian Road Research Board Ltd. Victoria, Australia.

Burkey, M., & Obeng, K. A. (2004, July) Detailed Investigation of Crash Risk Reduction Resulting from Red Light Cameras in Small Urban Areas, Urban Transit Institute. Transportation Institute. North Carolina Agricultural & Technical State University (prepared for U.S. Department of Transportation).

Council, F. M., Persaud, B., Eccles, K., Lyon, C., & Griffith, M. S. (2005, April). Safety evaluation of red light cameras. Federal Highway Administration. Publication No. FHWA-HRT-05-048.

Crist, C. (2005, July 12) Subject: Traffic, use of unmanned cameras. Advisory Legal Opinion – AGO 2005-41. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://myfloridalegal.com/__85256236006EB5E1.nsf/0/CE01BE293FCEEA208525703C00720344?Open&Highlight=0,ago,2005-41.

Federal Highway Administration. Stop red light running facts and statistics. Retrieved August 29, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://safety.fhwa.dot.gov/intersections/redl_facts.htm.

Federal Highway Administration and National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (2003, March 20) Guidance for using red light cameras. Washington, DC.

Fields, M. (2001, August 28). Statement before the California Legislature Senate Committee on Privacy: Automated enforcement laws. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from http://www.iihs.org/laws/testimony/pdf/testimony_mmf_082801.pdf.

Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. (2006) Florida traffic crash facts. Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://www.hsmv.state.fl.us/reports/crash_facts.html.

Florida House of Representatives. (2005). HB 1439 Red light violations. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=17099&SessionId=38.

Florida House of Representatives. (2006). HB 259 Red light violations. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=31782&SessionId=42.

Florida House of Representatives Staff Analysis. (2007, April 20) Economic Expansion & Infrastructure Council. Bill # CS/HB 1247, Uniform Traffic Control. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.myfloridahouse.gov/Sections/Bills/billsdetail.aspx?BillId=36326&SessionId=54.

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Florida Statistical Abstract. (2006). Bureau of Economic and Business Research. University of Florida. (Table 17.72). Gainesville, FL.

Florida Statutes. (2007). Chapter 316 State Uniform Traffic Control: 316.066 Written reports of crashes. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.leg.state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=Ch0316/SEC066.HTM&Title=->2007->Ch0316->Section%20066#0316.066.

Garber, N. C., Miller, J. S., Abel, R.E., Eslambolchi, S., & Korukonda, S. (2007, June). The impact of red light cameras (photo-red enforcement) on crashes in Virginia. Virginia Transportation Research Council Research Report. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.virginiadot.org/vtrc/main/online_reports/pdf/07-r2.pdf.

Hemenway, D. (2001). The public health approach to motor vehicles, tobacco, and alcohol, with applications to firearms policy. Journal of Public Health Policy, 22, 381-402.

Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. (2007, June). Q&As: Red light cameras. Retrieved November 17, 2007, from the World Wide Web: www.iihs.org/research/qanda/rlr.html.

Kyrychenko, S. Y., & Retting, R. A. (2004, November). Review of “A detailed investigation of crash risk reduction resulting from red light cameras in small urban areas” by M. Burkey and K. Obeng. Insurance Institute for Highway Safety.

National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). (2004). State average expenditures and average premiums for personal automobile insurance; 2003/2004 Auto Insurance Database Report.

National Motorists Association. Ticket cameras: NMA objections to photo enforcement. Retrieved September 14, 2007, from the World Wide Web: http://www.motorists.org/photoenforce/home/alternatives-to-red-light-cameras/.

NHTSA National Center for Statistics and Analysis, (2005). Traffic safety facts 2005, U.S. Department of Transportation.

Office of the Majority Leader. U.S. House of Representatives (2001, May). The red light running crisis: Is it intentional?

Persaud B. (2008) Civil Engineering faculty page. Ryerson University. Retrieved November 17, 2007 from the World Wide Web: http://www.ryerson.ca/civil/facstaff/Faculty/bhagwant.html.

Persaud, B. N., Hauer, E. J., Retting, R. A., Vallurupalli, R., & Mucsi, K. (1997). Crash reductions related to traffic signal removal in Philadelphia. Accident Analysis and Prevention, 29, 803-810.

Persaud, B. N., Retting, R. A., & Lord, D. (2001) Safety effect of roundabout conversions in the United States: Empirical Bayes observational before-after study. Transportation Research Report, 175, 1-8.

Pracht, E. E., Langland-Orban, B., Orban, D., & Flint, L. (2007, June 25). Differentials in triage to trauma centers and survival rates between elderly and non-elderly following motor vehicle crashes in Florida. Presented at Academy Health Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL.

Retting, R. A., & Kyrychenko, S. Y. (2002) Reductions in injury crashes associated with red light camera enforcement in Oxnard, California. American Journal of Public Health, 92, 1822-1825.

Stutler, D. J. (2006, March). FDOT: Red-light cameras need more research. Orlando Sentinel, A23. Synectics Transportation Consultants. (2003, December).

Final technical report: Evaluation of red light camera pilot project. Prepared for the Ontario Ministry of Transportation.

TheNewspaper.com. California: Cops reject red light camera sales pitch, (2006. November 11) (excerpt from Photo finish for drivers, San Gabriel Valley Tribune (CA)) Retrieved February 18, 2008, from the World Wide Web: http://thenewspaper.com/news/14/1441.asp.

TRIP: The Road Information Program. (2003, July). Designing roadways to safely accommodate the increasingly mobile older driver: A plan to allow older Americans to maintain their independence. Retrieved February 18, 2008 from the World Wide Web: http://www.tripnet.org/OlderDrivers2003Study.PDF.

TRIP: The Road Information Program. (2005, February). Highway safety fact sheet: How road and bridge improvements save lives. Retrieved September 26, 2007 from the World Wide Web: http://www.tripnet.org/hsfactsheet.htm.

About the Authors

Barbara Langland-Orban (.edu) is Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. Etienne E. Pracht (.edu) is Associate Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. John T. Large is Assistant Professor, Department of Health Policy and Management, University of South Florida College of Public Health, Tampa, FL. This paper was submitted to the FPHR on February 6, 2008, reviewed and revised, and accepted for publication on March 3, 2008.

About the Florida Public Health Review

The Florida Public Health Review offers an electronic on-line journal of practice and scholarship of interest and relevance to Florida’s public health practitioner and academic communities. Because the Review is presented as an electronic medium, communication can be rapid and immediate upon completion of editorial and refereed approval

The text in this article is copyright 2008 by the Florida Public Health Review.

Red-light Cameras cause an increase in rear-end & t-bone crashes. They also don’t stop people from running red-lights. “The most serious violations, those occurring more than 5 seconds into the red phase, did not drop in the three year period after the program began issuing tickets.”

Arkansas, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, Texas, Utah and West Virginia have enacted laws banning speed cameras. Two other states dropped their use of speed cameras after they generated intense public outcry. If traffic enforcement cameras were such a good thing, would they do that?

Lets take a look at some scientific studies for a possible explanation:

2006 Winnipeg, Canada found a 58% increase in the number of accidents. The accidents caused were also more costly to repair.

2005 the Virginia DOT found that cameras increased collisions there by 8-17%! Also a Washington Post story reported crashes at locations with cameras more than doubled, and that injury and fatal crashes climbed 81 percent! Yes, you read that right. The presence of these cameras make it more likely not less that you will be killed! T-bone collisions, rose 30 during that time frame.

2004 North Carolina A&T University study found no change in angle accidents and a large increases in the number of rear-end crashes when compared to other intersections.

2003 Ontario Ministry of Transportation study found average yearly number of reported collisions increased 15.1 per cent after cameras were installed.

1995 the Australian Road Research Board did not find any reduction in accidents. Instead they had increases in rear end and adjacent approaches accidents on a before and after basis and also by comparison with the changes in accidents at intersection signals. Monash University found: no significant relationship between the frequency of crashes at RLC and non-RLC sites.

Yet our elected officials want to make the same mistakes here? Why? Because money, not safety is behind the drive for traffic enforcement cameras. Contact your city council member and tell them you strongly oppose their dangerous fundraising scheme.

Australian Study of Red Light Cameras (Andreassen)

An exhaustive ten-year study of the effect of red light cameras on accident rates in Australia.

The most complete study of the correlation of accidents and the use of red light cameras. It closely examined every accident report filed over a ten year period (including several years before and after cameras were installed). It found the cameras provided no benefit.

The results of this study suggest that the installation of the RLC at these sites did not provide any reduction in accidents, rather there has been increases in rear end and adjacent approaches accidents on a before and after basis and also by comparison with the changes in accidents at intersection signals.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/95aussie.pdf 2.4mb PDF file.

Burkey-Obeng Red Light Camera Study

The most extensive U.S. study of the relation of accidents and red light camera usage.

Their own summary says it best: “The results do not support the view that red light cameras reduce crashes. Instead, we find that RLCs are associated with higher levels of many types and severity categories of crashes.”

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/burkeyobeng.pdf 366k PDF file.

Buckingham Speed Camera Study

UK/Australia study shows speed cameras reversed a decades-long trend toward fewer accidents.

Dr. Alan Buckingham of Bath Spa University College in England examined the safety data for speed cameras in both the UK and Australia. His results, published in the Australian journal Policy, show that speed camera usage actually reversed a decades-long trend toward fewer accidents.

http://www.cis.org.au/policy/spr03/polspr03-1.htm

Impact of Red Light Camera Enforcement on Crash Experience

This study reviews all prior studies conducted on the safety effects of red light camera systems.

Despite the claims of camera proponents, the safety benefit of cameras has never been proven in a statistically reliable study. This extensive review of existing material on cameras presents some very interesting information and exposes a number of flaws in methodology. Take into consideration the list of individuals who “contributed” to this review — the insurance industry’s Richard Retting and several other officials personally involved in running camera programs — and realize even implicit criticism is quite significant.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/syn310.pdf 1.4MB PDF file.

Virginia Transportation Research Council

The Virginia Transportation Research Council studied all of the state red light camera programs and found an overall increase in injury accidents.

Virginia DOT Study Shows Cameras Increase Injury Accidents
The cameras are correlated with an increase in total crashes of 8% to 17%.

The cameras are correlated with an increase in rear-end crashes related to the presence of a red light; the increase ranges between 50% and 71%.

The cameras are correlated with a decrease in crashes attributable to red light running, and the decrease is between 24% and 33%.

The cameras are correlated with a decrease in injury crashes attributable to red light running, with the decrease being between 20% and 33%.

The cameras are correlated with an increase in total injury crashes, with the increase being between 7% and 24%.

…but it obscures the that only a small percentage of crashes are attributable to red light running. Data from Virginia’s Department of Motor Vehicles, for example, suggested that in 1998 (a year when no red light cameras were in operation), only 3.3% of all crashes involved a driver who “ran traffic control” (DMV, 1999). Page 124

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-vdot.pdf 1.7mb PDF file.

US Intersection Fatalities and Camera Enforcement

Many types of intersection fatalities would not be prevented by red light cameras.

Red light cameras are promoted as devices that “save lives,” but a review of National Highway Traffic Safety Administration data shows that many of the fatal accidents at intersections would not have been stopped by red light camera enforcement. For instance, a driver being pursued by police officers isn’t likely to stop because there is an intersection camera. Nor is a drunk driver or someone who is ill or blacked out likely to be concerned with getting a ticket in the mail.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2004-fars.pdf 3.9mb PDF file.

Study: Cameras Increase Fatal Rear End Accidents (Ontario)

A December 2003 study sponsored by the Ontario, Canada government finds increase in accidents and fatal rear-end collisions from red light camera use.

The report also concludes that there was an overall reduction in serious accidents and angle collisions. A closer look at the data found in this government-sponsored report show that intersections monitored by cameras experienced, overall, a 2 percent increase in fatal and injury collisions compared to a decrease of 12.7 percent in the camera-free intersections that were used as a control group (page 21). In fact, the non-camera intersections fared better than the camera intersections in every accident category. The report’s overall accident conclusions would have appeared significantly worse had the camera-free intersections been excluded from the final results.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2003-ontario.pdf 1.5mb PDF file.

Wales: 70% Increase in Camera Tickets, 20% More Deaths

North Wales sees dramatic spike in speed camera tickets and a higher death toll.

From March 2004 to March 2005 the number of speed camera tickets issued in North Wales jumped seventy percent — producing £360,000 (US $690,000) in monthly revenue. Despite the sharp increase, the overall death toll on northern Welsh roads last year rose 20 percent — 59 fatal accidents in 2004 compared to 49 in 2003. For the entire year, the speed camera program generated £3.4 million (US $6.5 million) in revenue in 2004. Even examining only those roads with speed cameras show that there was no decrease in the death toll where the devices were used.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/wales/north_east/4482215.stm

UK Gov’t: Cameras Haven’t Reduced Speeding, Accidents

Full text of UK Department for Transport report showing no change in the speeds drivers travel since speed cameras were introduced.

Government statistics released this week from the UK Department for Transport undermine the claim that the devices have been effective in reducing vehicle speeds nationwide. According to the report, “The average recorded vehicle speeds hardly changed from those observed in previous years.”

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-transportstats.pdf 420k PDF file.

UK Stats Show More Speed Cameras Produce More Fatalities

UK Department for Transport statistics show road fatalities rise as more and more speed cameras are installed.

UK Department for Transport statistics show that road deaths have increased where speed cameras are most prevalent. In Cumbria, for example, when the number of speed camera sites grew by 48 percent the number of fatal accidents increased by 17 percent.

Before Cumbria’s speed camera partnership was formed in 2003, the area experienced 49 fatal road accidents in two consecutive years. But as soon as 33 speed camera sites became active, fatalities jumped to 54. Last year, with 49 speed camera sites there were 57 fatalities

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/05-ukdeaths.pdf 277k PDF file.

Secret UK Study: Speed Cameras Increase Injury Accidents

Full text of suppressed UK government study shows speed cameras increase accidents 31 percent on freeways, 55 percent in work zones.

The UK Department for Transport funded, then suppressed, a study that shows a 55 percent increase in injury accidents when speed cameras are used on highway work zones and a 31 percent increase when used on freeways without construction projects. According to the Transport Research Laboratory, the “non-works [personal injury accident] rate is significantly higher for the sites with speed cameras than the rate for sites without.”

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/04-trl595.pdf 620K PDF file.

Washington Post: Red Light Cameras Increase Accidents

Analysis of accident data shows accidents doubled at intersections with red light cameras in the District of Columbia.

Since the District of Columbia installed its first red light camera in 1999, The Washington Post has championed use of photo enforcement technology on both its editorial and news pages. Now, five years into the program, the District’s largest newspaper has discovered that accidents are up significantly as a result of their use.

The analysis shows that the number of crashes at locations with cameras more than doubled, from 365 collisions in 1998 to 755 last year. Injury and fatal crashes climbed 81 percent, from 144 such wrecks to 262. Broadside crashes, also known as right-angle or T-bone collisions, rose 30 percent, from 81 to 106 during that time frame.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/03/AR2005100301844.html

Georgia: Accidents Skyrocket at Marietta Camera Intersection

The red light camera in Marietta, Georgia has caused a 51 increase in accidents.

While the number of traffic accidents throughout Marietta, Georgia has increased fractionally over the past two years, the number of reported incidents jumped over 51 percent at the intersection of Cobb Parkway and Windy Hill Road. This intersection, the only one in the city with a red light camera, has seen a massive increase in primarily rear-end collisions. In 2004, there were 108 accidents of all types at the location. Last year, there were 163.

Statistics show the number of angle collisions, head-on collisions, sideswipes and rear-end collisions increased after cameras were installed.

http://www.11alive.com/news/news_article.aspx?storyid=75220

Winnipeg, Canada Report Shows Accidents Increased with Cameras

Independent city audit shows Winnipeg, Canada police use misleading statistics to hide the increase in accidents caused by photo enforcement.

An official audit of the Winnipeg, Canada photo radar and red light camera system shows that the city used misleading statistics in an attempt to cover-up the program’s failure to reduce accidents. Independent evidence cited in the report released to the public Wednesday indicates that the number of insurance claims for accidents, injuries and property damage expenses went up significantly at sites using camera enforcement in the year following the introduction of the devices.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2006/winnipegaudit.pdf 541k PDF file.

UK Road Fatalities and Injuries Rise Despite Cameras

The UK speed camera enforcement policy has failed to reduce either road injuries or road fatalities.

UK Department for Transport statistics released today show that the number of fatalities on British roads has not dropped significantly, despite a record number of ticketing cameras used to enforce speed limits. The latest available figures show 3201 road deaths occurred in the UK in 2005 compared to 3221 in 2004 — a difference of just 0.7%.

Non-fatal road injuries, despite the claims of police, have also risen according to a British Medical Journal (BMJ) study published last week. The BMJ researchers examined the police claim that the road injury rate had fallen from 85.9 per 100,000 in 1996 to 59.4 in 2004 and found that it did not ring true. By examining hospital records, the study found the road injury rate increased slightly from 90.0 in 1996 to 91.1 in 2004. The study attributes the discrepancy to “under-reporting” on the part of the police.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2006/uk-casualties05.pdf 365k PDF file.

Bakersfield, California: Red Light Cameras Increase Accidents

Red light cameras in Bakersfield, California have increased the numbers of accidents and injuries.

After three years of use, red light cameras in Bakersfield, California have increased the number of injuries and accidents at the eight intersections where they are used. Overall, the annual collision rate increased 17 percent. This increase is caused by a shifting of accident types from T-bone, down 28 percent, to rear end, up 47 percent. The shift in accident type, nonetheless did not reduce the number of injuries.

http://www.bakersfield.com/102/story/62523.html

Regina, Canada: Accidents Increase at Camera Intersections

City report shows overall number of accidents, property damage and injuries increased after red light cameras installed in Regina, Canada.

A Regina, Canada city report shows that accidents increased overall by 12 percent with injuries jumping 8 percent and property damage by 14 percent at the three intersections where red light cameras were installed in October 2000. The report considered eight years of data from Saskatchewan Government Insurance at the monitored intersections — four years before the devices were installed and four years after.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2006/regina.pdf 475k PDF file.

Swampscott, Massachusetts Report Rejects Red Light Cameras

A report by a town committee in Swampscott, Massachusetts recommends against red light cameras on the grounds of safety.

A committee established to determine whether Swampscott, Massachusetts should install red light cameras concluded Monday that the devices were not suitable for the town. In April 2006 town meeting, Swampscott residents rejected an initial attempt to install the devices. The selectmen created the committee to keep the camera idea alive. A former police officer and a former police chief along with an attorney voted 5-0 to approve the report.

“Analysis of this data revealed that, over the four year period, there has been a combined total of 10-13 angle crashes caused by red light running,” the report stated. “The limited number of angle crashes, combined with the likelihood that RLCs increase rear-end crashes, led the committee to conclude that the installation of RLCs is contra-indicated at all signalized intersections in Swampscott. Strictly on the basis of public safety, the committee recommends against the use of RLCs in Swampscott.”

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2006/swampscott.pdf 1.2MB PDF file.

Modesto, California Red Light Cameras Increase Injuries

Injuries from accidents at red light camera intersections up 19 percent in Modesto, California.

As red light cameras in Modesto, California are sending more people to the hospital, city officials have decided to double the number of intersections with the devices to increase revenue. Last year, each of the four intersections currently photo enforced experienced an increase in the number of collisions.

Although the total number of accidents is down slightly comparing 2006 figures to those in 2004 when the devices were first installed, accident severity has increased. Overall, the number of injuries at camera intersections jumped by 19 percent. A statewide Virginia Department of Transportation funded study of red light cameras arrived at nearly identical results in 2005.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/2007/modestoreport.pdf 128k PDF file.

Red Light Running Crisis: Is it Intentional

The report by the former House Majority Leader Dick Armey investigating the causes of the so-called red light running crisis.

The groundbreaking report by former House Majority Leader Dick Armey that found changes in the national formula used to determine yellow light timing has decreased steadily since red light cameras were introduced. After the report was issued, internal memos were uncovered in San Diego, California proved the report correct in its assertion that cities were intentionally placing cameras at intersections with short yellows.

Every study claiming red light cameras increase safety is written by the same man. Before joining the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), he was a top transportation official in New York City at the time the city began looking into becoming the first jurisdiction in the country to install red light cameras. In other words, the father of the red light camera in America is the same individual offering the “objective” testimony that they are effective.

http://www.thenewspaper.com/rlc/docs/finalreport.pdf 237k PDF file.

Is this really as serious of a problem as they make it out to be, serious enough to warrant the public accepting the intrusion of traffic enforcement cameras into their daily lives? During the last year in the entire city of Clarksville there were 1,470 accidents at intersections throughout the city, there were an additional 1,274 citations issued for either running a red light or stop sign. There are over 85 intersections in Clarksville which have traffic signals.  The entire city averages averages approximately 4 accidents at intersections per day. At Riverside Drive alone, during the last year over 39 million vehicles passed through that intersection. 

Studies have shown that these red-light cameras actually increase, not decrease accidents, and that the accidents caused by people panic breaking to avoid a citations are more serious injury accidents. While most intersection accidents are property damage rather than injury.

Why is Clarksville interested in making the same mistakes? It’s about finding new ways to take your money. They will make protestations that they are doing this for safety, but studies have proven that these cameras increase accidents rather than decrease them.  Indeed when spoken to by telephone City Councilman Geno Grubbs was dismissive of the safety concerns regarding these cameras. So they must have other motivations.

Ward 8 City Councilman Jim Doyle, chairman of the Public Safety Committee and sponsor of the failed cell-phone ban, said most vendors also offer equipment to ticket drivers who speed through intersections.

“I would like the whole package,” Doyle said. “Something has to slow the folks down.”

Ward 7 Councilman Geno Grubbs, a Public Safety Committee member who did not support the cell-phone ban, also would like to see cameras ticketing light-runners and speeders.

“It’s like having an officer there 24-7,” said Grubbs, himself a retired officer. – The Leaf Chronicle

A North Carolina A&T State University’s Transportation Institute, concluded after extensive analysis, that the 18 red light cameras in use on Greensboro thoroughfares may very well cause more accidents rather than fewer. According to the study, while wrecks overall were found to be decreasing, their incidence at intersections with surveillance cameras was increasing…

The other recent study analyzed the impact of speed cameras in London, England, and found that over hundreds of locations at which the surveillance devices were employed, the number of accidents had increased rather than decreased. At many other sites studied, accident rates remained the same.

As with their U.S. counterparts, London officials reap huge financial rewards from utilizing the cameras — a 20 percent annual profit after deducting installation and processing costs.

The London study found the prevalence of the traffic surveillance cameras was actually deadly, with nearly 400 of the camera sites registering an increase in people killed or seriously injured after the cameras were installed. – Bobb Barr on Rethinking red-light cameras

Fraud and manipulation of yellow light durations for profit have been common where these types of cameras are in use.  The National Motorists Association recommends that payments to subcontractor should be based on a reductions in violations and accidents and should not be based on the number of citations issued. On this I strongly agree.

Read on for a very detailed report: The Red Light Running Crisis: Is it intentional?

The Red Light Running Crisis: Is it Intentional?

Office of the Majority Leader
U.S. House of Representatives

May 2001

There’s a hidden tax being levied on motorists today. In theory, this tax is only levied on those who violate the law and putothers in danger. But the reality is that the game has been rigged. And we’re all at risk. We are told to accept the idea that our laws should be administered by machines—not human beings—because it is a matter of safety. We must accept this expansion of government and this Orwellian threat to our privacy because cameras are the solution to the so-called red light running crisis.

This is a federal issue, not just a local one.

The federal government is promoting and offering funding for this “solution”, because the safety benefits are supposed to be indisputable. After all, who’s going to object? Nobody likes a red light runner. They endanger themselves and others. They must be penalized.

But why have so many people become wanton red light runners all of a sudden? The answer seems to be that changes made to accommodate camera enforcement have produced yellow light times that, in many cases, are shortened to the point that they are inadequate. And when people come upon an intersection with inadequate yellow time, they are faced with the choice either of stopping abruptly on yellow (risking a 

 accident) or accelerating. The options for those confronting such circumstances are limited and unsafe. But each time a driver faces this dilemma, government increases its odds for hitting the jackpot.

This report suggests there is something that can be done to address this hazard. It cites examples of problem intersections where yellow times have been raised by about 30 percent and the number of people entering on red fell dramatically. It cites, in addition, controlled scientific studies that confirm the hypothesis that longer yellows are better. The following reductions in red light entries are documented:

•  
  • Mesa, Arizona 73%
  • Georgia 75%
  • Virginia site 1 79%
  • Virginia site 2 77%
  • Virginia site 3 Problem “virtually eliminated”
  • Maryland Problem “virtually eliminated”

It is no coincidence that each of the “problem” intersections mentioned above happened to have yellow times that fell short by about 30 percent. Today’s formula for calculating yellow times yields yellow times that can in some cases be about 30 percent shorter than the older formula.

And one should ask the question, if there’s a problem with an intersection, why don’t safety engineers in the field just go out and fix the timing?

In fact, before red light cameras arrived in the United States, that’s exactly what our regulations instructed them to do. If too many people enter on red at an intersection, engineers were supposed to lengthen its yellow time. But in the year that red light cameras first started collecting millions in revenue on our shores, those entrusted with developing our traffic safety regulations dropped the requirement to fix signal timing, instructing engineers to “use enforcement” instead.

Indeed, according to the Federal Highway Administration, these problem intersections serve as a great location to hold a press conference. The agency offers a script for local officials to exploit a tragically mistimed intersection to call for the installation of additional red light cameras and tout their safety benefits.

But none of the reports that are supposed to tell us that red light cameras are responsible safety benefits actually say that. First, they dismiss increases in rear-end collisions associated with red light cameras as “non-significant,” despite evidence to the contrary. Second, they do not actually look at red light intersection accidents. The latest accident study in Oxnard, California, for example, only documents accident reductions “associated with”—not caused by— red light cameras. Although that statement has little scientific value, it does have great marketing appeal if you don’t look too closely.

Every study claiming red light cameras increase safety is written by the same man. Before joining the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), he was a top transportation official in New York City at the time the city began looking into becoming the first jurisdiction in the country to install red light cameras. In other words, the father of the red light camera in America is the same individual offering the “objective” testimony that they are effective.

A similar conflict of interest affects those entrusted with writing safety regulations for our traffic lights. The Institute of Transportation Engineers is actively involved in lobbying for, and even drafting legislation to implement, red light cameras. They are closely tied to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS), which in turn is funded by companies that stand to profit handsomely any time points are assessed to a driver’s license.

In short, the only documented benefit to red light cameras is to the pocketbook of local governments who use the devices to collect millions in revenue.

We traded away our privacy for this. We gave up our constitutional protections for this. In return, we are less safe. That is the red light camera scam, and it has gone on for far too long.

I. Something Funny is Going On

A local television station in Beaverton, Oregon (KOIN-TV) discovered the effects of inadequate yellow light times when investigating the red light camera controversy in its area. The following is excerpted from a newscast broadcast February 14, 2001:

ELAINE MURPHY (reporting): So it got us to wondering just how this program is working. About how many people are getting tickets and, most importantly, is there something funny about how this is set up?
…

MURPHY: So we took out the stopwatch. The yellow here [where there is a red light camera] is three seconds and a fraction. It’s a big intersection—we measured 111 feet across. Yet a few blocks away at 107th and Beaverton-Hillsdale at an intersection measuring a mere 75 feet, the yellow lasts almost a second longer. Why?

LINDA ADLARD (Beaverton City Official): I really don’t know why that would have a different timing.

MURPHY: We kept checking. The intersection with a camera, a little over three seconds for yellow. The next intersection to the east, four seconds. The one after that, four seconds. And the one after that, and the one after that.

ADLARD: I think probably this is timed this way because of the volume of traffic.

MURPHY: By the way another red light running camera goes into service next Tuesday at Lombard and Allen. The length of yellow? Three seconds. Just thought you’d like to know.

It is clear from this example that there is something funny going on. This jurisdiction has been caught red-handed playing with signal timing on lights that have red light cameras. But that’s just the beginning of the story.

To understand why a jurisdiction would do something like this, one needs to know a little more about the incentives behind red light cameras.

II. Red Light Cameras and Revenue

Red light cameras raise a tremendous amount of money for the jurisdictions that use them. It is easier to set up a camera than it is to employ a human being to enforce the law. Consequently, about 50 cities across the country in ten states issue tickets to motorists with red light cameras. And the number of cameras continues to grow.

It’s not surprising that local and state governments are jumping at the opportunity to collect revenue from motorists with these devices. Consider the examples below:

• Washington, D.C. A single camera collected $1 million in revenue. A line item in the city’s FY2001 budget assumed there would be $16 million in fines collected from the 37 cameras deployed throughout the city. The Washington Post, May 19, 2000.
• San Diego, CA. A single camera collected $6.8 million in revenue in 18 months. The 19 camera program as a whole has brought in nearly $30 million in the same period. San Diego Union Tribune, May 5, 2001.
• Sacramento, CA. The program collects an estimated $800,000 a year. Sacramento Bee, April 16, 2001.
• Ventura, CA. The program will collect an estimated $3.2 million during its first 12 months. Ventura County Star, March 29, 2001.
• West Hollywood, CA. The program collects an estimated $4.9 million a year. Los Angeles Times, March 25, 2001
• Baltimore County, MD. The program has collected $6 million as of January 2001. Baltimore Sun, January 28, 2001.
• Howard County, MD. The program has collected $4 million from more than 70,000 tickets issued between 1998 to 2000. Baltimore Sun, January 28, 2001.
• Charlotte, NC. The program will collect over $1 million. Minneapolis Star Tribune, April 4, 2001.
• New York, NY. In its first full year of operation, the 15 red-light cameras racked up 168,471 tickets, collecting $5,435,815 in fines. Car & Driver, May 1999. “The city last year sent out more than 400,000 tickets to drivers caught on camera running red lights and collected $9 million in revenue, said city Department of Transportation spokesman Thomas Cocola.” New York Post, May 9, 2001. The fines are trending upward

Consider how fee structures are changing:

• California. The highest in the nation fine of $271 is collected from motorists and one point is assessed against the driver’s license.
• Montgomery County, MD. “Local officials have asked the state Legislature to approve a fine increase to $250. Current fines in the county are $75 if caught on camera.” USA Today, February 6, 2001.
• Arizona. The legislature is considering a bill to raise the fine statewide to $250. Phoenix raised a $125 fine to $175, plus two points against the driver’s license. Arizona Republic, January 16, 2001.
• Delaware. The fine was raised from $25 to $75 in July 2000. USA Today, February 6, 2001.

III. The Theory: If There’s a Problem, Lengthen the Yellow

There is no doubt that red light cameras present an attractive option for those interested in collecting additional revenue. But there may be another way to solve the red light running “crisis”—lengthening yellow times.

A little yellow makes a lot of difference

A case study of two intersections entitled “The Influence of the Time Duration of Yellow Traffic Signals on Driver Response” (1980), reported that a 30 percent increase in yellow time yielded substantial safety benefits. “The Results in Table 3 show that the extension of yellow duration reduced the frequency of potential conflicts in all cases studied,” (page 27).

The first site studied found an extra second and a fraction of yellow had an immediate and definitive safety pay-off:

“An increase of 1.4 seconds or about 30 percent in yellow duration virtually eliminated all potential conflicts at the Maryland site,” (page 27, emphasis added).

Similarly, the second site in Georgia realized a 75 percent reduction in potential conflicts following a 32 percent increase in yellow time. These figures agree with those found in Section 4 of this report, below.

The yellow light’s purpose

To understand why an increase in yellow has such a significant safety impact, one must consider the traditional purpose of the yellow traffic light. The yellow indication is designed to warn a motorist approaching an intersection that the signal is about to turn red. The yellow light should be long enough for the approaching motorist to either, (a) come to a safe stop before the intersection, or (b) continue clear through the intersection before the red light appears. An inadequate yellow time will either prevent motorists from coming to a safe stop or force them to enter the intersection on a red light. Neither option should be considered acceptable.

The diagram above illustrates what happens when an automobile approaching an intersection sees the yellow light. Drivers who are in the “Can’t Go” zone as the light turns yellow know they are too far back and won’t be able to reach the intersection before the light turns red—they must stop. Drivers who are in the “Can’t Stop” zone know they’re too close to the intersection to stop safely—they must proceed. But when the yellow time is inadequate, there is place in between both zones where the driver can neither proceed safely, nor stop safely. Engineers call this the “Dilemma Zone.”

A properly timed signal will have enough yellow time that driver’s will never be faced with the impossible choice presented by the dilemma zone. By determining the stopping and clearing distances for a given approach speed, one can always calculate a safe yellow time that offers drivers a safe option, by design, every time.

What if there’s a problem?

Still, an engineering formula may not perfectly account for all the variables that might exist at an intersection. In such cases, the engineer has a tool, known as a countermeasure, that he must employ to remedy the situation. Namely, the engineer must lengthen the amount of yellow time. Even the 1985 ITE proposed recommended practice provides for this yellow time “measure of effectiveness”:

When the percent of vehicles that are last through the intersection which enter on red exceeds that which is locally acceptable (many agencies use a value of one to three percent), the yellow interval should be lengthened until the percentage conforms to local standards. (Page 6.)

It is the duty of an engineer to double-check his work and make sure that there is not a problem with red- light entries at each intersection.

Red Light Camera proponents agree

This truth is not disputed. Even in literature intended to promote the use of red light one finds the inescapable truth that lengthening the yellow can be the appropriate thing to do if there’s a problem. In the study “Red Light Running and Sensible Countermeasures”, author Richard Retting agrees that longer yellow times can often substantially reduce accidents and redlight running:

Signals that provide insufficient yellow intervals cause some drivers to run red lights inadvertently. However, many drivers who run red lights are provided adequate opportunity to stop safely but choose instead to proceed through a red light signal…. (Page 1.)

Increases in the length of the yellow signal toward values associated with the ITE proposed recommended practice significantly decreased the chance of red-light running. (Page 2.)

What is surprising is that the author, despite acknowledging that insufficient yellow causes red light running, considers red light cameras as the only solution. In the first citation given above, he makes an effort to blame motorists for running lights, even when the yellow time is inadequate. Furthermore, in the report’s “summary and conclusion” (page 4), “signal modification” rates only a passing mention in half of a sentence—he devotes the rest of the discussion to the virtues of red light cameras. Note that the signal modification he refers to is the already shortened ITE practice, not the longer yellow times a properly timed intersection would use (see Section 5, below).

‘Longer yellow signals reduce red light running, there is no question about it,’ said Richard Retting, senior transportation engineer at the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety. ‘I can’t say with any certainty if that has any effect on crashes, but there is some evidence that longer yellows can cut down on crashes.’ (Las Vegas Review Journal, October 20, 2000.)

Eighty percent of entries occur during the first second of red

The relation between yellow time and red light running is most clearly found in the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety’s study of red light running entitled “Red Light Running and Sensible Countermeasures” (1998). Although the report’s intention is to prove the need for red light camera enforcement, the data in the report provides additional insight into the red light running question. A chart found on page 2 of the report (summarized below) indicates quite clearly that almost 80 percent of red light entries occur within the first second of the red light indication.

This strongly suggests that inadequate yellow time is the major cause of red-light entries. If the vast majority of red light entries occur in the first second after the yellow light expires, it is reasonable to assume an additional second of yellow time on that light will yield a nearly 80 percent decrease in red light entries.

IV. The Fact: Longer Yellow Reduces Red Entry

Mesa, Arizona

When yellow times are lengthened at intersections, red light entries plunge. Mesa, Arizona found a 73 percent drop in citations after the yellow light was extended.

Mesa increased the left-turn yellow arrow duration to four seconds, from three seconds, on Nov. 14, after complaints from drivers who felt the time was too short to safely complete their turns. The change was made at 30 intersections with dual left-turn lanes and left-turn arrows. In November, the city issued 1,639 left-turn arrow citations at the six intersections patrolled by cameras. In December, the month after the change, the number fell to 716. In October, the month prior to the change, Mesa issued 2,645 citations. (Arizona Republic, February 6, 2001.)

To most, this decrease in red-light running violations would be most welcome news. But it was not welcome news to the city of Mesa. That’s because once yellow signal timing changes were made, the camera went from a money-maker to a $10,000 money- loser. The response of the local bureaucracy was typical:

Meanwhile, the department will propose eliminating the three-tenths of a second grace period that [the camera] allows from the time a light turns red to the time the camera flashes. ‘We want to establish a zero tolerance policy for red light running in Mesa,’” [Mesa police Commander Richard] Clore said. (Arizona Republic, February 6, 2001.)

Some of Mesa’s red-light cameras are working so well that police are talking about disconnecting them… In some cases, it’s only catching one person a day. [Mesa police Commander Richard] Clore said that may be because the city recently lengthened its yellow lights by a second. (Arizona Republic, May 22, 2001.)

Fairfax County, Virginia.

Like Arizona, Virginia, has also seen outstanding results from increased yellow times. In testimony before the Kentucky State Senate, IIHS study author Richard Retting reported that, on average, someone runs the red light at US50 in Arlington, Virginia every 12 minutes.

Yet just a few miles down the road at the intersection of westbound US50 and Fair Ridge, the Virginia Department of Transportation (VDOT) raised the yellow to 5.5 seconds from 4.0 seconds last summer. Since the change, red light running has almost disappeared at the location.

This is very significant and substantial evidence to show that increased yellow times reduce entries on red at problem intersections.

V. Changes in the Safety Codes

Where do the problem intersections come from? We’ve seen that experience tells us that if there’s a red light running problem, yellow light times should be increased. And the theory tells us the same. So why have yellow signal times decreased? The answer is that the organizations responsible for maintaining our intersection safety codes have altered the regulations specifically to accommodate camera enforcement and decrease yellow times.

The chart below provides the theoretical minimum yellow clearance signal times based on speed and intersection width from the 1976 edition of the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) handbook. Note that the 100-foot intersection in Beaverton, Oregon had a 3.1 second yellow signal time in a 30MPH zone, as mentioned in Chapter 1 above. As one can see from the chart, that time would be inadequate for any condition. But it’s quite profitable for the red light camera installed at that location.

To understand more fully the extent of changes to the signal timing codes, one must first examine the prior formula used for calculating yellow times.

The 1976 ITE Handbook

In 1976, yellow time was known as the “yellow clearance interval.” This was the theoretical minimum amount of time needed for an automobile to clear the far side of the intersection from a given distance away, or come to a safe stop. This was calculated by adding three variables:

1. Reaction time: How long it takes, on average, to recognize the situation and decide whether to stop or continue through the intersection. Usually this is 1.0 seconds.
2. Stopping time: This figure is calculated based upon the length of the intersection and the average deceleration rate for automobiles.
3. Time needed to clear the intersection: Based on the approach speed, how long it would take an automobile to traverse the length of the intersection.

The 1985 ITE Proposed Recommended Practice

By 1985, ITE had begun to change the way signal times were calculated in the past. The first modifications were published in their “Proposed Recommended Practice” a mere three years after New York City began researching how it would implement the first red light cameras in the United States.

These changes were further explained in the 1989 ITE Journal article, “Determining Vehicle Signal Change Intervals.” This report begins by clearly stating that the ITE’s intent is to change laws across the country because, “adopting a uniform method cannot precede adoption of uniform laws” (page 27). In other words, for red light cameras to be adopted nationwide, the laws must change nationwide. And they provide at least three methods that have as their result a reduction, in most cases, of yellow signal time as well as easy adoption of camera enforcement.

1. Their goals are not entirely safety related

The goals and objectives of the 1985 and 1989 documents are clearly related to red light camera enforcement. Consider:

Goal: Recommend legal definitions for the various aspects of the change interval and a defensible methodology for calculating and evaluating change intervals. (1985, page 5; 1989 page 27.)

And the second signal timing objective listed:

Allow easy identification of violators by law enforcement agents. (1985, page 5; 1989, page 28.)

This is a strange goal for someone who wants to design safer intersections. Yet it is a perfect goal for one whose true intent is not safety but rather the convenient installation of a red light camera.

2. Reduced Yellow I: Ignore the Actual Speed of Traffic

The first method for reducing yellow time is found on page 29 (1989) where the document states, “It may be possible to use the posted speed as the approach speed.”

What that means is that signal times would be determined by the speed limit rather than the actual speed 85 percent of traffic is traveling, known as the “85th percentile speed.” The result of this change in practice would be an underestimate of the actual speed of vehicles at the intersection. And this factor alone can result in yellow time shortfalls of 20 percent or more.

The laws of physics dictate that the distance required to stop your car is based entirely on the speed at which you are traveling, not what is printed on a sign on the side of the road. No rational safety consideration would lead one to choose posted speed over actual speed. But it does allow for a reduction in yellow light time.

3. Reduced Yellow II: Replace yellow time with “all-red clearance”

Take the traditional definition and formula for calculating the duration of the yellow light signal. You might need three seconds of yellow to warn approaching motorists that they need to stop, and two more seconds of yellow on top of that to allow vehicles enough time to clear before opposing traffic is given the green light. The total yellow time for such an intersection would be five seconds.

On page 30 of the 1989 report, the ITE proposes to take that five seconds of yellow in the hypothetical intersection above and reduce it to three seconds of yellow, and two seconds in which all sides of the intersection are given the red light (this is known as the “all-red period”). Eliminating that much yellow time, again, is of questionable safety value. But there is no question that in practice this method would yield an increase in the number of vehicles that enter the intersection on red, given the two second reduction in the amount of time one would have to clear the intersection legally. Again, it is unlikely that a rational safety consideration would lead you to choose this method. But it does allow for a reduction in yellow light time. And it will increase red light running. Why? Because the light turns red faster.

Changes were made to the code specifically for camera enforcement

These changes are significant. But if it was not clear enough in the above documents that ITE had cameras in mind in 1985, they make it explicit a few years later. The 1994 ITE “Determining Vehicle Signal Change and Clearance Interval” states:

When the percentage of vehicles that entered on a red indication exceeds that which is locally acceptable, the yellow change interval may be lengthened (or shortened) until the percentage conforms to local standards, or enforcement can be used instead. (Page 5, emphasis added).

In other words, if too many people are running red lights, jurisdictions need not address deficiencies in intersection design or signal timing. Instead, they can simply “use enforcement” by putting up a red light camera. They are suggesting creation of an intersection that will have a perpetually high level of red light runners by design. Since enforcement by police officers wouldn’t be 24-hours a day, it is hard to conceive that they had anything other than 24-hour red light cameras in mind.

Changes in the yellow light formula linked to red light running

The changes in the yellow signal timing regulations have resulted in the inadequate yellow times. And these inadequate yellow times are the likely cause of almost 80 percent of red light entries, as discussed above.

If we look closely at one of the intersections Retting studied, the signal at Columbia Pike at Greenbrier in Arlington, Virginia, we find that it has a measured yellow time of 4.0 seconds. This location was the second site studied in his “Red Light Running and Sensible Countermeasures.” Using the 1999 formula results in a one second (20 percent) decrease in the yellow time compared to the 1976 formula. And, as mentioned above, according to Retting’s study, 77 percent of red light entries happened in that first second the light was red instead of yellow.

Thus, if the old formula had been employed, the red light entry problem Retting studied would have been substantially reduced.

Elimination of the vehicle change interval, a chronology

It may be useful to consider the following excerpts from signal timing regulations that, when presented in chronological order, show a clear progression toward lowering yellow times to accommodate red light cameras:

• 1985—ITE, “Determining Vehicle Change Intervals: A Proposed Recommended Practice,” states, “When the percent of vehicles that are last through the intersection which enter on red exceeds that which is locally acceptable (many agencies use a value of one to three percent), the yellow interval should be lengthened until the percentage conforms to local standards.”
• 1988—Federal Highway Administration, “Manual on Traffic Control Devices” (MUTCD) states, “Signal Operation Must Relate To Traffic Flow” (Section 4B-20). Note that red light camera promoters use the opposite principle: they wish to use signals to modify traffic flow.
• 1994—ITE, “Determining Vehicle Signal Change and Clearance Intervals” states, “When the percentage of vehicles that enter on a red indication exceeds that which is locally acceptable, the yellow change interval may be lengthened (or shortened) until the percentage conforms to local standards, or enforcement can be used instead.”
• 1999—ITE, “Traffic Engineering Handbook: Fifth Edition” states, “The red clearance interval is an optional interval that follows a Yellow Change Interval and precedes the next conflicting green interval. The red clearance interval is used to provide additional time following the Yellow Change Interval before conflicting traffic is released” (page 482).
• 2000/2001—Federal Highway Administration, “Manual on Traffic Control Devices” (MUTCD) states, “47. Red Clearance Interval: an optional interval that follows a yellow change interval and precedes the next conflicting green interval” (page 4A-5, Part 4, Highway Traffic Signals). Yellow time is calculated from “E. The posted speed or statutory speed limit or the 85th percentile speed on the uncontrolled approaches to the intersection” (page 4C-3).

In all the above citations, emphasis is added to the key changes. The words in italics mark the differences between the old and new codes. Namely:

1. The “should” in 1985 was changed to “may” in 1994.
2. “Or shortened” was added to the formulation in 1994.
3. “Or enforcement can be used instead” was added in 1994.
4. “Optional” was added to the definition of red clearance interval in 1999.
5. Finally, the Federal Highway Administration endorses all these changes in the December 2000 edition of the MUTCD.

VI. Why Have Reports Shown Cameras to be Effective?

Overview of U.S. Red Light Camera Studies

Jurisdictions that wish to claim safety as their motive for installing red light cameras will invariably cite studies that show the devices reduce red light running and the intersection collisions it causes. To date, the only case studies of red light running and camera use in the United States have taken place in Arlington, Virginia, City of Fairfax, Virginia and Oxnard, California.

The studies performed at these locations share a lot in common, mostly because they were all performed by the same researcher. Consequently, they also share many of the same flaws in methodology.

How to do a proper study: Australia

One can see the flaws more clearly when they are contrasted with the 1995 Australian Road Research Board report, one of the most comprehensive looks at the effect of red light cameras to date.

The report’s conclusion is the most striking, particularly considering the American coverage of this issue: “There has been no demonstrated value of the RLC as an effective countermeasure” (page 1). And when one considers the study’s methodology, one must also wonder why the same thoroughness is not found in Retting’s American studies:

• Comprehensive, ten-year study. The report examined accidents five years before and five years after the installation of red light cameras.
• Objective. On pages 2-3, the report points out how prior Australian studies conveniently omitted crucial data that might have undermined any pro-red light camera conclusions.
• Uses actual accident reports. Prior Australian studies merely used accident databases to generate results and statistics. All accidents in the database marked with certain codes were deemed to relate to red light running. Unfortunately, that method assumed the accidents were always properly coded. Of the 6,200 accident report forms examined, 960 (15 percent) were found to be unrelated to the intersections studied, despite their coding. For example, accidents at an adjacent McDonalds parking lot were coded as if they took place in the nearby intersection. This shows that conclusions based merely on accident codes can be significantly misleading.
• Signal Timing Considered. Although ultimately unsuccessful, the study at least attempted to document any changes in signal timing that may have occurred during the study period:Inquiries were made of VicRoads traffic signals group about the changes at signals and it seems that the historical records have been archived. From the data that was obtained for three intersections… it was apparent that a number of changes had taken place. These changes included… changes in phases as well as phase and cycle times and provisions for green arrows. The changes to the intersections were apparent, but the dates these changes took effect was not. For this reason the changes could not be related back to subsequent changes in accident frequency. Further investigation into signal changes would be worthwhile to explain some of the abrupt changes at individual RLC sites. (Page 9)

Red Light Cameras and Rear-end Accidents

The Australian study goes on to conclude that red light cameras tend to cause rear-end accidents. “This study suggests that the installation of the RLC at these sites did not provide any reduction in accidents, rather there have been increases in rear end and adjacent approaches accidents on a before and after basis…” (Page 20).

This should come as no surprise. The goal of a red light camera is to make people fear being ticketed if they enter a camera-controlled intersection on red. Common sense dictates that if the desired effect of red light cameras is achieved, there will be an increase in rear-end accidents. This is because motorists fearing a ticket will panic and slam on their brakes to avoid entering an intersection. This sudden maneuver can surprise cars and trucks behind, causing a collision.

The 2001 IIHS Oxnard accident study admits a connection between red light cameras and rear end accidents:

Some additional rear-end crashes might result from non-uniform changes in driver behavior. For example, if drivers stop more often for red lights, they may be struck from behind by drivers not intending to stop. (2001 Oxnard study, page 2.)

One wonders if Retting considers perhaps that those same individuals are unable to stop, because of inadequate yellow time. The increase in rear-end accidents in this report are passed off as insignificant.

But are they?

These photos, found on the Oxnard, California police department website, were taken by red light cameras. They illustrate rear end collisions apparently caused by motorists panic-stopping.

Yellow Light Timing

As we have seen, yellow signal timing is fundamentally linked to red light entries. The 1999 Oxnard study concludes that since red light cameras were installed that there was a 40 percent reduction in red light violations at intersections with cameras, and a 50 percent reduction at intersections without cameras. But the study did nothing to document whether signal times, including yellow light times, were held constant throughout the duration of the research. There is reason to believe, based on the Australian findings, that the signal timings did in fact change during the study. Despite this, the author merely says that the times were “checked” and “deemed adequate”:

The duration of yellow traffic signal timing has been found to influence red light running at urban intersections (Retting and Greene, 1997). Therefore, yellow signal times at the camera sites were checked against an Institute of Transportation Engineers (1985) proposed recommended practice and were found to be adequate. (1999 Oxnard study.)

The same language is used in the 1999 Fairfax and 2001 Oxnard studies. But, as discussed in Chapter 5 above, the 1985 proposed ITE yellow times can often be inadequate. It is reasonable to suspect they played a significant role in the red light entries that are documented in the report.

But the 1985 proposed recommended practice was not followed. The proscribed countermeasure for excessive red light entries is an increase in the yellow signal time (page 6 of the 1985 ITE guidelines). This was not performed. And if it had been implemented, it is likely that the pro-camera conclusion of the reports would have been undermined.

Moreover, if indeed the yellow time in the three studies was set to the numeric amounts resulting from the 1985 ITE practice, the excessive red light running that resulted tends to confirm the inadequacy of the yellow time from the practice itself.

Actual red light accidents not studied in 2001 Oxnard report

Incredibly, the 2001 IIHS Oxnard study did not actually study any accidents caused by red light running. “…the crash data did not contain sufficient detail to identify crashes that were specifically red light running events…” (2001 Oxnard report, page 1). Nor did it even study accidents at intersections that have red light cameras.

Instead, the study’s author, Retting, merely looked at accident codes from a database over a 2 and a half- year period to claim that accidents throughout the Oxnard area dropped by about 30 percent as a result of the red light cameras. The connection between area accidents and red light cameras is only an implied connection. There is no scientific evidence in the report showing any demonstrable connection between the two.

That is why the 2001 report is entitled “Crash Reductions Associated With Red Light Camera Enforcement in Oxnard, California.” Notice that it does not say, ‘caused by.’ But, nonetheless, the report is still used as a marketing tool to sell red light cameras.

Drops in “violations” are no measure of success

At times, jurisdictions that IIHS did not study will find other ways to “prove” the success of their red light camera program, particularly when they wish to order additional camera units. They simply cite the number of “citations” or “violations” at intersections. And they claim red light cameras are a success if there are any reductions. Of course, they fail to note that the number of both citations and violations given is entirely within the control of the camera operators.

It’s easy, for example, to turn off the camera for a period of time to achieve the desired number. The camera can be loaded with half a roll of film. Shifting the cameras around will alter the data. Cameras malfunction and are taken out of service for repairs. Signal timings, including lengthening the yellow, can happen without being reported. These are just a few of the many “tricks” or potential oversights available.

It is clear, then, that the justifications given for red light camera installations are questionable.

VII. Conclusion

The subject of signal timing can be difficult and obscure. And for that reason, the proponents of red light cameras have been able to escape close scrutiny.

Transportation officials and engineers know that the yellow signal timing is essential to safety. The data showing this to be the case are found in their studies. Nonetheless, some have systematically and intentionally ignored the inescapable engineering fact that longer yellows would solve the so-called crisis caused by shortened yellows.

Red light cameras present a perverse disincentive for local jurisdictions to fix intersections with excessive red light entries. It’s hard to fix a “problem” that brings in millions in revenue.

In other words, red light cameras aren’t fixing a safety problem, they’re creating one. And, with the federal government’s assistance, state and local governments are undermining the vital constitutional protections our Founders put in place. The right to face one’s accuser in court and the presumption of innocence form the bedrock of our judicial system.

Camera-based law enforcement can only work when these principles are ignored.

We should never have allowed the personal privacy of our citizens to be undermined by these Big Brother devices. In the name of safety, we sacrificed our privacy. But now it is clear that we have been asked to relinquish our cherished freedoms for an entirely empty promise.

VIII. References

Signal Timing Documents

Institute of Traffic Engineers, “Traffic Engineering Handbook,” Institute of Traffic Engineers, 1965.

Institute of Transportation Engineers, “Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook,” Prentice-Hall, 1976.

William A. Stimpson, Paul L. Zador, and Philip J. Tarnoff, “The Influence of the Time Duration of Yellow Traffic Signals on Driver Response,” ITE Journal, November 1980.

Institute of Transportation Engineers, “Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook,” Prentice-Hall, 1982.

Institute of Transportation Engineers, “Determining Vehicle Change Intervals: A Proposed Recommended Practice,” Institute of Transportation Engineers, 1985.

ITE Technical Committee 4A-16, “Proposed Recommended Practice: Determining Vehicle Signal Change Intervals,” ITE Journal, July 1989.

ITE Technical Council Task Force 4TF-1, “Determining Vehicle Signal Change Intervals,” Institute of Transportation Engineers, August 1994.

Richard A. Retting, Allan F. Williams, Michael A. Greene, “Red Light Running and Sensible Countermeasures,” Transportation Research Record, 1998.

Institute of Transportation Engineers, “Transportation and Traffic Engineering Handbook,” Institute of Transportation Engineers, 1999.

“Manual on Traffic Control Devices”, Federal Highway Administration, 2000.

Accident Studies

David Andreassen, “A Long Term Study of Red Light Cameras and Accidents,” Australian Road Research Board, February, 1995.

Richard A. Retting, Allan F. Williams, Charles M. Farmer, Amy F. Feldman, “Evaluation of Red Light Camera Enforcement in Oxnard, California,” Accident Analysis and Prevention 31, 1999.

Richard A. Retting, Allan F. Williams, Charles M. Farmer, Amy F. Feldman, “Evaluation of Red Light Camera Enforcement in Fairfax, Va., USA,” ITE Journal, August 1999.

Richard A. Retting, Sergey Y. Kyrychenko, “Crash Reductions Associated with Red Light Camera Enforcement in Oxnard, California,” Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, April 2001.

General Articles

International Association of Chiefs of Police, “Selective Traffic Enforcement Manual,” National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, January 1972.

Rudolph E. Popolizio, “New York City’s Red Light Camera Demonstration Program,” Compendium of Technical Papers, 1995.

Brian S. Bochner, “Automated Enforcement Reduces Crashes,” ITE Journal, August, 1998

Richard Retting, “Statement Before the Kentucky Senate Transportation Committee on Red Light Violations and Red Light Cameras,” March 9, 2000.

The report The Red Light Running Crisis: Is it Intentional? was by the Office of the Majority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives in May 2001